The Arab conquests of the seventh century were the principal external catastrophe of medieval Greek-Christian Christendom, and the event from which the eastern Empire emerged in the form — territorially Anatolian and southern-Balkan, demographically Greek-speaking, doctrinally Orthodox — that it would maintain for the next eight hundred years. Within a single generation between Muhammad's death at Medina in 632 and the Umayyad consolidation in the 660s, the empire lost Syria, Palestine, Egypt and the North African provinces that the Justinianic reconquest had only recently re-incorporated. The first major Arab siege of Constantinople in 674–678 was held off; the second in 717–718 was held off again. Beyond those defensive successes lay the substantive recognition that the late-antique Mediterranean order had ended.
The exhausted Empire
The eastern Empire that the Arab armies confronted in the 630s was exhausted by the most recent of its perennial wars with Sasanian Persia — the war of 602–628, prosecuted by Heraclius against Khosrow II, which had produced an initial Persian victory (the loss of Syria, Palestine and Egypt to Persian armies between 614 and 619, the Persian capture of the True Cross at Jerusalem in 614, the Persian siege of Constantinople in 626 in concert with the Avars) and a Roman counter-stroke (Heraclius's invasion of Mesopotamia in 627, the Battle of Nineveh in December 627, the Persian internal collapse and the restoration of the lost provinces in 628–629). The exhausted recovery of 628–632 had not produced the reorganisation of the imperial army and finances that the situation required. When Arab raiding forces appeared on the southern frontier of Palestine in 633–34, the imperial response was the dispatch of but tactically mishandled field armies.
Yarmouk
The decisive engagement was the Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 — six days of fighting in the upper Yarmouk valley (southern Syria, south-east of the Sea of Galilee) between an Arab field army under Khalid ibn al-Walid (approximately twenty-five thousand men) and an imperial field army under Vahan and Theodore the Sakellarios (approximately forty thousand men, including Armenian, Slavic, Lakhmid and Ghassanid auxiliaries). The Arab tactical victory — attributable to Khalid's operational manoeuvre, to the cohesion of the Arab forces under recent religious-political mobilisation, and to the weaknesses of the multi-ethnic imperial command structure — produced the complete destruction of the imperial Syrian field army and the collapse of the Roman administrative position in Syria within eighteen months. Damascus had already surrendered in September 634; Jerusalem fell in 637, Antioch in 638, the remaining Syrian and Palestinian cities through 639–640. The Egyptian campaign under 'Amr ibn al-'As proceeded in 640–642: the battle of Heliopolis in July 640, the surrender of the great fortress of Babylon-in-Egypt in April 641, the capitulation of Alexandria in November 642. The North African provinces fell progressively over the subsequent half-century, culminating in the Arab capture of Carthage in 698.
Why the East fell
The historiographical question has been the apparent ease of the conquests. The principal contributing factors that the literature has canvassed: the exhaustion of the imperial military by the immediately preceding Persian war; the fiscal depletion of the imperial treasury; the disaffection of the Monophysite Christian populations of Syria and Egypt from the imperial Chalcedonian Orthodoxy (whose persecution under Heraclius and his successors had alienated the provincial populations); the relative novelty and high morale of the Arab forces; the Arab strategic skill in successive operational deployments; the relative quality of the leadership on both sides. The verdict of recent historiography — particularly James Howard-Johnston's Witnesses to a World Crisis (2010) — is that the conquests were the consequence of a military superiority of the Arab forces of the period, combined with the weakness of the contemporaneous imperial military, and that the cultural-religious explanations (the Monophysite welcome of the Arabs) are overstated.
The administrative reconstruction
The reduced empire of the post-642 period — Anatolian, southern-Balkan, southern-Italian, with a few residual coastal positions in North Africa and the Aegean islands — underwent an administrative reorganisation under Constans II (641–668) and Constantine IV (668–685). The change was the institution of the thematic system: the substitution of military-administrative provinces (themata) for the late-antique civil-and-military separation. Each theme was administered by a strategos with combined military and civilian authority; the themes raised their own regional armies, predominantly through grants of land to soldiers in return for military service; the centralisation of administrative authority that had characterised the Justinianic empire was relaxed in favour of provincial decentralisation. The thematic system was the institutional adaptation that permitted the eastern Empire to survive on diminished resources.
The first siege of Constantinople
The first sustained Arab attempt on the imperial capital was the siege of 674–678 — a sequence of summer naval expeditions against the Marmara coast and the Bosphorus during four consecutive campaigning seasons, conducted by the Umayyad caliph Mu'awiya I. The Roman defence under Constantine IV produced one of the technological breakthroughs of the medieval period: the introduction of Greek fire, an incendiary naval weapon (likely a petroleum-based mixture, the exact composition of which has been debated) that could be projected from siphons mounted on Roman naval galleys and that proved effective against the Arab fleet. The Arab withdrawal in 678 and the subsequent thirty-year truce (the Treaty of 679) demonstrated the limits of the Arab military capacity against the defensive resources of the imperial capital.
The second siege of 717–718, conducted by Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik on behalf of his brother the caliph Sulayman, was the Arab attempt on Constantinople. The Arab forces comprised approximately a hundred thousand troops with a naval contingent; the Roman defence under Leo III, who had seized the throne shortly before the siege opened, drew on Greek fire (against the Arab fleet), on the Theodosian walls, on the winter weather (which produced Arab casualties from cold and disease), and on the diplomatic intervention of the Bulgarian khan Tervel (who attacked the Arab land forces from the north). The Arab withdrawal in August 718, with fleet and army losses, was the end of the period of Arab strategic expansion against the Empire. The frontier stabilised along the Taurus Mountains for the next three hundred years.
The substantive outcome
The eastern Empire that emerged from the eighth century was smaller — perhaps a third of the territory of the Justinianic empire at its peak — but it was Greek-speaking, homogeneous in its Orthodox Christianity, adapted to its reduced economic and military resources through the thematic administrative system, and defended by the natural frontier of the Anatolian plateau, the Aegean Sea and the Balkan mountains. The cultural-religious self-identification of the Empire would shift, over the eighth and ninth centuries, from late-antique Roman to medieval Greek-Christian. The dispute over religious imagery — the iconoclast controversy — that would dominate the next century is the subject of chapter IV.
Why the empire survived when Persia did not
The Arab armies that came out of Arabia in the 630s destroyed the Sasanian empire completely within twenty years. They took from Byzantium its richest provinces — Syria, Palestine, Egypt and North Africa, perhaps three quarters of its territory and half its revenue — and then failed to take the rest. The difference is worth explaining, because it determined the next eight centuries.
Geography did some of it. Anatolia is a plateau ringed by the Taurus mountains, and once the frontier settled on that range it could be held with a small number of passes watched by a warning system of beacons that could carry news of a raid to the capital in about an hour. Persia had no comparable line to fall back to.
The sea did more. Constantinople could be supplied indefinitely by ship as long as the navy held, and the two great Arab sieges — 674 to 678 and 717 to 718 — both broke on the walls and on Greek fire. The second is the one that mattered: an army and fleet under Maslama besieged the city for a year, lost the fleet to fire and a winter, and withdrew having destroyed the caliphate's capacity for further offensives in the north for decades.
The state also reorganised itself, converting the provinces into military districts — the themata — in which soldiers held land in return for service, and shrinking the administration to what a much poorer empire could pay for. It was a brutal contraction, and it worked. The empire that emerged in the eighth century was smaller, poorer, more militarised and considerably more durable than the one that entered the seventh.
End of Chapter III