The two decades between the First Punic War's conclusion in 241 BC and the outbreak of the Second Punic War in 219 BC were a transformation of the Carthaginian state. The loss of Sicily and the indemnity payments produced a fiscal crisis; the revolt of the demobilised mercenary army from the Sicilian war produced a civic-survival crisis; and the response to both crises produced the Barcid project for a new territorial empire in the Iberian peninsula. The military and political dominance of the Barcid family — Hamilcar Barca, his son-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair, and his son Hannibal — over the post-war Carthaginian state shifted the centre of gravity of the empire from the Mediterranean trade routes to the Iberian land empire.
The Mercenary War
The Carthaginian field army that had served in Sicily during the First Punic War comprised, in outline, four principal contingents: a Punic-citizen cavalry and infantry corps (approximately 20,000 men); a Libyo-Phoenician contingent from the North African agricultural territory (approximately 30,000); Berber-Numidian cavalry from the Carthaginian-allied tribes; and mercenary contingents recruited from across the western Mediterranean — Iberians, Celts (from the Gaulish and Celtic-Iberian frontiers), Balearic slingers, Greek hoplites, Italians. The demobilisation of these forces after the Treaty of Lutatius required the payment of accumulated back pay — three years' worth — to troops who had been fighting for the Punic cause for two decades.
The Carthaginian Senate's mishandling of the demobilisation — the troops were concentrated at the principal disembarkation point of Sicca in central Tunisia rather than being dispersed to their homelands as they were paid, and the Senate then attempted to negotiate reductions in the accumulated pay rather than paying it in full — produced the revolt of late 241 BC. The mercenary forces under the leadership of the Campanian Italian Spendius and the Libyan Mathos mutinied, marched on Carthage, and raised the Libyo-Phoenician agricultural population in revolt against Punic rule.
The Mercenary War (241–238 BC) was prosecuted with savagery on both sides. The Carthaginian field forces under Hanno and (later) Hamilcar Barca were mauled in several engagements through 241–240 BC; the mercenary forces conducted atrocities against Carthaginian prisoners that the Punic commanders reciprocated. The Roman role in the conflict — exploiting the Carthaginian weakness, refusing to permit Carthaginian recruitment of Italian mercenaries, and seizing the Carthaginian-held islands of Sardinia and Corsica in 238 BC against Carthaginian protests — worsened the Carthaginian position. The conclusion of the war by Hamilcar Barca in 238 BC — after the defeat of the principal mercenary forces at the battles of "The Saw" and the siege of Tunis — produced the restoration of Carthaginian authority over North Africa, but at the cost of the loss of Sardinia and Corsica to Rome and the doubling of the Roman war indemnity to 4,400 talents.
The Barcid family
The principal figure of the post-war Carthaginian state was Hamilcar Barca (c. 275 – 228 BC), the general who had commanded the Punic forces in western Sicily in the final phase of the First Punic War and who had concluded the Mercenary War. The Barcid family — Hamilcar, his son-in-law Hasdrubal the Fair, his sons Hannibal (born 247 BC), Hasdrubal Barca (born c. 244) and Mago — were the dominant figures of Carthaginian politics for the subsequent three decades. The Barcid political faction combined: military command (Hamilcar held the principal field commands continuously from 247 BC until his death in 228, an exceptionally long tenure); popular following (based on the military victories and on the alliance with the democratic faction in the Carthaginian assembly); commercial wealth (accumulated through the Iberian campaigns); and dynastic continuity (the succession of Hamilcar by his son-in-law and by his sons in the Iberian command).
The Iberian project
The Barcid strategic response to the post-1st-war Carthaginian situation was the transformation of the Iberian commercial network into a territorial land empire. The existing Punic presence in Iberia — the coastal trading colonies at Gadir, Sexi, Abdera, Carteia, the Tartessian silver-mining region of south-west Iberia — was extended through military campaigns to incorporate portions of the Iberian interior under direct Carthaginian administration. The strategic logic comprised four elements: recovery of the Carthaginian fiscal position (the Iberian silver mines were productive); development of a recruiting base for the Carthaginian army (the Iberian and Celtiberian populations provided high-quality infantry and cavalry); accumulation of economic resources beyond the Roman commercial control; and the preparation of a new strategic theatre for the inevitable next war with Rome.
The Iberian campaigns were prosecuted in three phases. Hamilcar Barca conducted the first phase from 237 BC until his death in battle in 228 BC, expanding from the Gaditane bridgehead into the southern Iberian interior; the principal campaigns took the Tartessian region, the Sierra Morena silver mines, and the coastal cities as far north as the White Cape (Cape San Vicente). Hasdrubal the Fair conducted the second phase from 228 BC to his assassination in 221 BC, extending the empire northward along the Iberian Mediterranean coast and founding the new capital city of Qart Hadasht (New Carthage, modern Cartagena) at a harbour location halfway between Gadir and the Ebro. Hannibal conducted the third phase from his appointment as commander in chief in 221 BC, completing the reduction of central Iberia.
New Carthage
The foundation of New Carthage (Qart Hadasht in Punic, Carthago Nova in Latin, modern Cartagena) by Hasdrubal the Fair in 227 or 228 BC was the symbolic moment of the Iberian project. The site — a sheltered harbour on the south-eastern coast of Iberia, with mining country in the immediate hinterland and natural defences — became the principal Barcid base, the residence of the Barcid command, and the principal city of the new empire. The population in the 220s BC has been estimated at approximately 40,000, with the principal workforce in the silver mines a further 40,000 enslaved.
The Ebro Treaty
The Roman observation of the Iberian project was alarmed. The Roman embassy to Hasdrubal in approximately 226 BC produced the Ebro Treaty — an agreement under which the Carthaginian expansion was limited to the territory south of the river Ebro, with the Roman commercial interests in the north-eastern Iberian coast (the Greek-Massaliote colony of Emporion and its dependent communities) protected. The treaty codified an informal division of the Iberian peninsula into a Carthaginian southern sphere and a Roman-protected northern fringe.
The complication of the treaty was the position of the city of Saguntum — a coastal city south of the Ebro, within the formal Carthaginian sphere, but with pre-existing diplomatic relations with Rome that the Roman Senate had regarded as protective. The Saguntine political-diplomatic position through the late 220s BC was the flashpoint of the subsequent crisis.
The eve of war
By 221 BC, when Hannibal succeeded Hasdrubal as commander in chief at the age of 26, the Carthaginian Iberian empire comprised the entire peninsula south of the Ebro and west of the Pyrenees. The Carthaginian military force comprised approximately 90,000 troops with cavalry and elephant contingents. The economic base was productive. The political base was loyal. The Barcid political programme — preparation for the inevitable next war with Rome — was substantially complete.
The siege of Saguntum from May 219 BC, the Carthaginian capture of the city in November 219 BC, the Roman declaration of war in spring 218 BC, and Hannibal's march across the Pyrenees and the Alps into the Italian peninsula are the subject of chapter VII.
End of Chapter VI