The First Punic War (264–241 BC) was the longest single war the Roman Republic had ever fought — twenty-three years — and the transformation of the Roman state from a central-Italian republican infantry power into the principal naval power of the Mediterranean. The war was prosecuted across Sicily, the surrounding waters, and the North African coast. The loss of life and material on both sides was substantial; the cost of the war to Carthage was a war indemnity, the cession of Sicily and the subsequent loss of Sardinia. The war is one of the principal turning points of ancient Mediterranean history.
The Messana incident
The occasion of the war was a minor political crisis at the Sicilian city of Messana (modern Messina, at the north-eastern tip of the island, overlooking the strait that separates Sicily from the Italian peninsula). Messana had been occupied since approximately 289 BC by the Mamertines — a mercenary band of Campanian-Italian troops who had previously served the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles, and who had murdered the city's Greek inhabitants and taken control of the city after Agathocles' death. By the 270s BC the Mamertines had become a regional nuisance, raiding the neighbouring cities and undermining the Syracusan position in eastern Sicily.
In 265 BC the new Syracusan tyrant Hieron II conducted a campaign against the Mamertines that threatened their continued occupation of Messana. The Mamertines split into factions, with one party appealing to Carthage for protection and the other party appealing to Rome. The Carthaginian Senate dispatched a garrison to Messana in 264 BC; the Roman Senate, after internal debate over whether to extend Roman protection to a city that had been seized through illegitimate massacre by a band of mercenaries, voted to dispatch a Roman expedition. The pro-Roman Mamertines expelled the Carthaginian garrison; the Carthaginian Senate declared the Roman intervention an act of war; the Roman intervention proceeded.
The Roman political-strategic logic of the intervention has been argued about for two thousand years. The principal motivations attested in the surviving sources include: the geopolitical concern that a Carthaginian Messana would threaten the Roman south Italian coast across the narrow strait; the alliance-political concern that Rome's Italian alliance system required Roman protection of those who appealed for it; the commercial-economic concern that Carthaginian commercial dominance of Sicily was inconsistent with Roman trading interests in the central Mediterranean; and a component of Roman senatorial ambition for a new theatre of military operations. Polybius's Book I, the principal source for the war, presents the intervention as a calculated step toward a broader strategic confrontation with Carthage that the Roman political elite had been anticipating for some time.
The first phase, 264–260 BC
The first phase of the war was prosecuted entirely on Sicilian land. The Roman expeditionary force under the consul Appius Claudius Caudex landed at Messana in 264 BC and relieved the Mamertine garrison. The Syracusan king Hieron II initially fought against the Roman force but in 263 BC switched sides and concluded a fifty-year alliance with Rome that would endure throughout both Punic wars; Syracuse became the principal Roman supply and operational base in Sicily for the subsequent two decades. The Roman field operations through 263–261 BC reduced the Carthaginian positions in eastern and central Sicily; the Roman siege of Acragas in 261 BC — six months of fighting — produced the Roman capture of the city. By 261 BC the Carthaginian land position in Sicily had been reduced to the western coastal cities (Lilybaeum, Drepana, Panormus and a few others).
The Roman navy
The second phase of the war — from 260 BC — was the Roman construction of a navy. The pre-war Roman state had no naval force of its own; the maritime defence of the Italian coast had been conducted by allied Greek-Italian cities (Tarentum, Neapolis, Velia). The Carthaginian naval superiority of the early war — Carthage's fleet of approximately 200 quinqueremes outclassed any force the Roman side could muster — was the principal Carthaginian advantage. The Roman response was the construction in 260 BC of a new fleet of approximately 120 quinqueremes, copied (according to Polybius) from a Carthaginian quinquereme that had been wrecked on the Italian coast at the start of the war.
The Roman tactical innovation that equalised the naval situation was the substantial corvus — a boarding bridge mounted on a swivel at the bow of the Roman ship, with a spike at its free end. The corvus could be dropped onto an enemy ship at close range, locking the two vessels together and permitting Roman infantry to board and fight in their element. The first deployment of the corvus at the Battle of Mylae in 260 BC produced a Roman victory — approximately 50 Carthaginian ships captured against minimal Roman losses — and the first Roman naval victory of the war.
The African expedition
The Roman strategic confidence after Mylae produced the ambitious decision of 256 BC: a Roman expedition to invade Africa itself. The Carthaginian fleet attempting to intercept the Roman expedition was defeated at the Battle of Ecnomus in 256 BC — the largest naval battle of the ancient world, with approximately 330 Roman ships and 350 Carthaginian ships engaged, producing approximately 100 Carthaginian ships captured or destroyed against Roman losses of approximately 24 ships. The Roman expedition under the consul Regulus landed in North Africa in late 256 BC and prosecuted a campaign against the Carthaginian agricultural hinterland; in the winter of 256–255 BC Regulus offered Carthage peace terms that the Carthaginian Senate rejected as unacceptably harsh.
The Carthaginian recovery was produced by the reorganisation of the Punic field army under the Spartan mercenary general Xanthippus, who trained the Punic forces in Hellenistic-style phalanx tactics and deployed elephant contingents. The Battle of Tunis in the spring of 255 BC produced the defeat and capture of Regulus and approximately 500 Roman troops, with casualties. The subsequent fate of Regulus has been the subject of Roman literary tradition — including the story that he was permitted to return to Rome on parole to deliver Carthaginian peace terms, urged the Senate to reject them, and returned to Carthage to be executed by torture; the historicity of the story has been debated. What is certain is that the African expedition failed substantially, the Roman field army in Africa was destroyed, and the subsequent attempt to evacuate the Roman survivors by sea produced the naval disaster of 255 BC, in which a Roman fleet of approximately 250 ships was destroyed by a storm off the Sicilian coast with the loss of approximately 100,000 men.
The long Sicilian phase
The subsequent fifteen years of the war (255–241 BC) were prosecuted predominantly in Sicily, in siege operations against the Carthaginian-held western Sicilian cities of Lilybaeum and Drepana. The Roman siege of Lilybaeum from 250 BC was the principal operation of the period — a nine-year investment of the fortress that the Carthaginians supplied by sea through blockade-runners. The Battle of Drepana in 249 BC produced the principal Roman naval defeat of the war: a Roman fleet under the consul Publius Claudius Pulcher attempted a dawn attack on the Carthaginian fleet at Drepana harbour and was defeated with the loss of approximately 90 ships out of 123 engaged. The subsequent Roman storm-loss off Camarina in 249 BC completed the naval disaster.
The Aegates Islands and the Treaty of Lutatius
The conclusion of the war was produced by the Roman naval recovery of 242–241 BC. The Roman state, after the naval losses of the 240s, raised the financing for a new fleet of approximately 200 quinqueremes through private subscription by the wealthier Roman citizens (the first such fiscal arrangement in Roman history). The new fleet under the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus engaged the Carthaginian relief fleet under Hanno at the Battle of the Aegates Islands on the 10th of March 241 BC, off the western coast of Sicily. The Roman tactical preparation — training of crews, newly-built ships without the corvus (which had been abandoned after seaworthiness problems in the late 250s) — defeated the Carthaginian fleet, capturing approximately 70 ships and destroying a further 50.
The defeat at the Aegates was the decisive engagement of the war. The Carthaginian land forces in Sicily under Hamilcar Barca (the father of Hannibal) were intact but cut off from supply by the Roman naval superiority; the Carthaginian Senate authorised Hamilcar to negotiate peace. The Treaty of Lutatius of 241 BC imposed the terms: the Carthaginian evacuation of all of Sicily; the release of all Roman prisoners without ransom; the payment to Rome of an indemnity of 3,200 talents of silver over ten years. The subsequent renegotiation (demands by the Roman Senate to harshen the terms) increased the indemnity to 3,200 talents and shortened the payment period.
The First Punic War ended with the Carthaginian loss of Sicily — the principal Punic overseas territory for three centuries — and the Roman emergence as the principal naval power of the western Mediterranean. The subsequent Mercenary War of 241–238 BC, the Barcid recovery in Iberia, and the road to the second war are the subject of chapter VI.
End of Chapter V