The Romans sowed the ground with salt.
False
No ancient source says so. Not Polybius, who was probably present at the destruction; not Appian, who describes the seventeen days of street fighting in detail; not Livy, Diodorus or Strabo. The story appears nowhere in antiquity.
It seems to have entered circulation in the nineteenth century and to have been established by the 1930s, when it turns up in the Cambridge Ancient History without a citation. The scholar B. L. Hallward is often blamed. The image is compelling — a curse of sterility, borrowed from Assyrian and biblical practice — and it stuck.
It is also economically absurd. Salt was expensive, Africa was the richest agricultural province in the western Mediterranean, and Rome refounded the city on the same spot a century later and farmed the hinterland for six hundred years. This volume is subtitled after the myth, which seemed the honest way to carry it.
Carthaginians routinely sacrificed their children.
Partly true, but more complicated than that
The classical sources are emphatic: Diodorus describes a bronze statue of Baal Hammon with sloping arms from which infants rolled into a fire, and says 500 children were given in a single crisis in 310 BC. Plutarch, Tertullian and Kleitarchos say similar things.
Every one of these writers was hostile, most wrote centuries after the event, and none was an eyewitness. Against that, the Tophet at Carthage and its equivalents at Motya, Tharros and Sousse contain thousands of urns of cremated infants and young animals, and some carry inscriptions recording a vow fulfilled.
The current scholarly balance accepts that ritual infant sacrifice occurred, probably rarely and probably in extremity, and rejects the scale and regularity the Roman accounts describe. Osteological studies published since 2010 have argued both ways and have not settled it. What can be said firmly is that a practice used to justify a genocide should be examined more carefully than the perpetrators examined it.
Hannibal crossed the Alps with a great herd of elephants.
Mostly false
He started from Spain with thirty-seven. He arrived in Italy with most of them, which is genuinely remarkable, and then lost all but one in the marshes of the Arno and the winter that followed. The survivor was called Surus — the Syrian — and Hannibal rode it.
By Trasimene in 217 BC he had no elephants at all, and he fought the entire fifteen-year Italian campaign without them. The elephants at Zama in 202 BC were a new and poorly trained force raised in Africa, and they were a liability: Scipio opened lanes in his line and had trumpets sounded, and most of the animals ran straight through and out the back.
The animals were probably the now-extinct North African forest elephant, considerably smaller than the African bush elephant and about the size of the Asian. The idea of Hannibal on an elephant crossing a snowfield is a nineteenth-century painting, not a description.
Carthage was a nation of shopkeepers with no culture of its own.
False
This is Roman contempt, repeated for two thousand years because the Carthaginians left nothing to contradict it with. Not one work of Punic literature survives complete.
We know there was a literature because Rome disposed of it. When the city fell, the Senate gave the libraries to the Numidian kings — and made one exception, ordering Mago's twenty-eight-volume treatise on agriculture translated into Latin by decree, because it was too useful to lose. It was still being quoted by Roman writers three centuries later. Hanno's account of an Atlantic voyage down the African coast survives in Greek translation.
What we can see directly is the material culture: the purple dye industry, the jewellery, the terracottas, the town planning at Kerkouane with a bath in every house. That is not a trading post. The fides Punica — Punic faith, meaning treachery — was a Roman slur about a people who had, on the record, kept their treaties rather better than Rome kept its.
Cato ended every speech with <em>Carthago delenda est</em>.
Partly true, but more complicated than that
He did press relentlessly for the destruction of Carthage in the years before 149 BC, and the sources agree that he attached the demand to speeches on entirely unrelated matters. Plutarch says he ended by declaring that Carthage must be destroyed; Pliny tells the story of him producing a fresh African fig in the Senate to show how close and how rich the enemy still was.
The phrase itself is not ancient in that form. Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam is a modern reconstruction, and Carthago delenda est is a further modern shortening of it. No surviving Latin text of the period gives either.
Cato's argument, incidentally, was economic rather than military. He had visited Carthage in about 152 BC and found it recovered and prosperous, fifty years after a defeat that was supposed to have finished it. That was the threat.
Carthage was a Phoenician colony, so it was basically Lebanese.
Mostly false
It was founded from Tyre, traditionally in 814 BC, and kept religious ties to the mother city for centuries — an annual tithe was still being sent to the temple of Melqart at Tyre in the fourth century BC.
But Carthage was politically independent from early on, and it stopped being Phoenician in any useful sense long before Rome met it. Alexander destroyed Tyre in 332 BC; the Levantine cities passed to Hellenistic and then Roman rule; Carthage went on for another two centuries as an entirely African power, ruling a Libyan and Numidian population, drawing its armies from Iberians, Balearic slingers, Gauls and Numidian horse, and speaking a Punic that had diverged from Phoenician into its own language.
Punic was still being spoken in the African countryside in Augustine's day, in the fifth century AD — six hundred years after the city fell.
It was a Carthaginian empire like the Roman one.
False
It was not an empire in the Roman sense at all, and the word in the title of this volume is a convenience.
There were three quite different things. There were the old Phoenician foundations — Utica, Hadrumetum, Gadir — which were allies with their own treaties rather than subjects. There was the African hinterland, taxed heavily and directly, which is where the tribute came from and where the revolts came from. And there was a network of trading posts and garrisons around the western Mediterranean which functioned as commercial concessions rather than provinces.
There was no citizenship offered to the conquered, no legal system exported, no road network binding the parts together. Where Rome absorbed, Carthage extracted. When Carthage lost a war, its subjects had no particular reason to stay loyal, and mostly did not. That is the structural reason it lost.
Hannibal should have marched on Rome after Cannae.
Partly true, but more complicated than that
His cavalry commander Maharbal is supposed to have said it at the time — that Hannibal knew how to win a victory but not how to use one — and Livy repeats it with relish.
The practical objections are serious. Hannibal had no siege train; his engineers had been left behind in Spain, and Rome's walls were the Servian circuit, eleven kilometres of them. He had perhaps 40,000 men and no secure base within 400 kilometres. Rome had raised fresh legions within weeks of Cannae and refused even to discuss ransoming the prisoners.
His actual strategy was rational: not to capture Rome but to break the confederation around it, by demonstrating that Rome could not protect its allies. It half worked. Capua, Tarentum and much of the south did come over. But the Latin core held, and the war then became one of attrition that Carthage could not win.
The Punic Wars were about trade rivalry.
Mostly false
It is the explanation everyone remembers from school, and the evidence for it is thin. Rome in 264 BC was not a commercial power and had no merchant interest to protect; it barely had a navy. Carthage was not excluding Roman traders — the two states had signed at least three treaties, in 509, 348 and 279 BC, which divided spheres amicably and which Polybius quotes.
The first war began over Messana, where a band of Campanian mercenaries who had seized the city appealed to both Rome and Carthage for protection, and both responded. It escalated because neither would withdraw from Sicily. The second began over Saguntum and the Barcid recovery in Spain. The third began because Cato and others decided a recovered Carthage was intolerable regardless of what it did.
These are wars about security, prestige and the momentum of rivalry. The commercial reading is a nineteenth-century projection.
Carthage was destroyed and that was the end of it.
False
The city was destroyed thoroughly in 146 BC, the site formally cursed, and the territory made into the province of Africa. That lasted about a century.
Julius Caesar planned a refoundation and Augustus carried it out in 29 BC. Roman Carthage became the second city of the western empire, with perhaps half a million people, the baths of Antoninus, and a Christian community that produced Tertullian, Cyprian and — at nearby Hippo — Augustine. The Vandals took it in AD 439 and ruled from it for a century. Belisarius recovered it for Byzantium in 533. The Arabs took it in 698, at which point the population moved to Tunis and the stones went into other buildings.
So the site was continuously important for another eight and a half centuries after the destruction. What ended in 146 BC was Carthage as a state, not Carthage as a place.