Volume XX · 1955 — 1975
The Republic of Vietnam, formally declared in October 1955 by Ngô Đình Diệm after a referendum he supervised, recognised by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and most of the non-Communist world, supported by an American military commitment of up to 540,000 troops at peak, fell to a People's Army of Vietnam armoured assault on Saigon on the 30th of April 1975.
Foreword
The political construction of the Geneva Accords of July 1954, which temporarily partitioned the former French Indochina at the seventeenth parallel pending a unifying election to be held in July 1956. The election was never held. The partition became permanent. The country south of it took its own name, drafted its own constitution, and was a country.
Whether the Republic of Vietnam was a legitimate sovereign state is a question that historians, jurists and Vietnamese themselves have argued about for sixty years and still argue about. The case for sovereignty: it had a written constitution; it held elections (although these were notoriously irregular under Diệm and only modestly cleaner under his successors); it was a member of the United Nations system as a non-member observer; it was diplomatically recognised by some seventy states; it had functioning institutions of government for twenty years; it maintained a national currency, a national army, a national broadcaster, a national curriculum. The case against: it was a creation of the Geneva Accords as a temporary administrative zone rather than a sovereign state; the 1956 unifying election would, on most assessments, have produced a Communist-led unified Vietnam; the United States' military and financial support was decisive in its survival from 1965 to 1973; its government was substantially captured by military and religious factions that did not, by any plausible standard, represent the population at large.
The Lost Lands position is that the Republic of Vietnam was a state for the purposes of this library — it was internationally recognised, it had functioning sovereignty over a defined territory and population, and its existence as a distinct political entity for twenty years is too consequential a fact to leave out. Whether it should have existed at all is a separate and more difficult question, and the volume tries to be honest about how that question looked in 1955, 1963, 1968 and 1975.
The narrative covers the Geneva partition, the Diệm dictatorship, the Buddhist crisis and the 1963 coup, the American escalation through 1965, Tet 1968, Vietnamisation, the Paris Accords of 1973, and the collapse of April 1975. Then we go to the country itself — Ho Chi Minh City (still Saigon to most older inhabitants), Huế, Đà Nẵng, the DMZ at the seventeenth parallel, Khe Sanh, the Cu Chi tunnels — and walk through what is left of the war and the country.
The Book — eight chapters
After the book — three ways to travel inside South Vietnam
The Guide
Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) — the Independence Palace, the War Remnants Museum, the Continental Hotel. Huế and the citadel. The DMZ and Khe Sanh. The Cu Chi tunnels. Da Nang and Hue. The Mekong delta. Ten stops, in modern Vietnam.
The Routes
Highway 1 from Saigon to Hanoi (the Reunification Express runs alongside); and the DMZ Route from Hue to Khe Sanh, Vinh Moc, Quang Tri, and the boundary marker at the Hien Luong bridge over the Ben Hai river.
The Errors
The war was not unwinnable. The Tet offensive was not a Communist victory militarily. The South Vietnamese army did not "refuse to fight". The Paris Accords did "end" the war for the United States. Eight beliefs about South Vietnam laid politely to rest.