Mythbusters

Ten things
people get wrong
about the Empire.

Most of them descend from a single joke made by a Frenchman in 1756, and from nineteenth-century German historians who found the Empire an embarrassing ancestor for the nation-state they wanted.

13 min read

It was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.

False

Voltaire wrote it in 1756, and it is the most quoted sentence ever written about the subject. It is also wrong three times, and he knew it — the line is a joke about an institution he found absurd, not an analysis.

Holy: the emperor was crowned by the pope for six centuries, was the secular head of Latin Christendom, appointed bishops and abbots across the Empire, and held sovereignty over dozens of ecclesiastical principalities that existed nowhere else in Europe.

Roman: the claim was to continuity from Charlemagne, who was crowned in Rome in 800 by a pope who regarded the imperial throne as vacant. Emperors were crowned in Rome until 1452, the law was Roman law, and the Empire's Italian territories were governed as such into the eighteenth century.

Empire: at its height it covered modern Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, the Low Countries, eastern France, Slovenia and northern Italy, with perhaps twenty-five million subjects. Voltaire was being funny. He has been taken literally for two hundred and seventy years.

It was basically Germany.

Mostly false

The formal title from the late fifteenth century was the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and the core was German-speaking. But the Empire was never coterminous with Germany and was not a nation-state of any kind.

It included the kingdom of Bohemia, whose ruler was an elector and whose people were Czech; the kingdom of Burgundy; the Low Countries until 1648; Milan and Tuscany; Savoy; and Switzerland until 1499 in practice and 1648 in law. Its subjects spoke German, Czech, Italian, French, Dutch, Slovene, Frisian and Sorbian.

Equally, large German-speaking populations lay outside it — East Prussia, which is why the Hohenzollerns could call themselves kings there without an imperial title, and the Baltic and Transylvanian settlements.

The Empire was a legal order that a great many peoples belonged to. Reading it as proto-Germany is a nineteenth-century habit, and it distorts everything.

The emperor was a figurehead with no real power.

Mostly false

He could not tax the Empire directly, could not legislate alone, and had no standing imperial army. Those are real limits, and after 1648 they were severe.

But he appointed to the imperial courts, granted and confirmed the privileges on which every city and territory depended, ennobled, legitimised, chartered universities, ran the imperial fiefs in Italy, and had the final say in disputes between princes — which was the Empire's main business. He was also, from 1438 onward with one break, a Habsburg, and the Habsburg hereditary lands gave him an army and a treasury of his own.

Charles V ruled Spain, the Netherlands, Naples and the Americas alongside the Empire. Ferdinand II very nearly used the Thirty Years' War to convert the Empire into a hereditary monarchy, and was stopped by a coalition that had to include France and Sweden to manage it.

An office that requires two great powers to constrain it is not ceremonial.

The Empire was permanently at war with itself.

Mostly false

The Thirty Years' War is what everyone remembers, and it was catastrophic. But it is remembered precisely because it was exceptional.

From 1495 the Empire had a standing prohibition on private warfare — the Ewiger Landfriede, the eternal public peace — enforced through the Imperial Chamber Court at Speyer and Wetzlar and the Aulic Council in Vienna. Between them these courts handled something like 200,000 cases. Small territories used them constantly against large ones, and won often enough for the system to be worth using.

For the century after Westphalia, internal violence between imperial estates was rare, and the Empire's wars were mostly external, against France and the Ottomans. A political order that gave three hundred sovereignties a way of suing one another instead of raiding one another was doing something difficult and doing it reasonably well.

The Golden Bull was a papal document.

False

A bulla is the seal, not the sender. The Golden Bull of 1356 is an imperial decree of Charles IV, so called because it carried a golden seal rather than the usual wax.

It is one of the most successful constitutional documents in European history. It fixed the electoral college at seven, named its members, made their territories indivisible and hereditary, set the election at Frankfurt, the coronation at Aachen and the first diet at Nuremberg, and — crucially — removed the papacy from the process altogether. Before it, disputed elections and papal claims to approve the outcome had produced a century of civil war. After it, they largely stopped.

It remained in force for four hundred and fifty years, until 1806. The original copies are in Vienna, Frankfurt, Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Darmstadt and Vienna again.

It fell to Napoleon in 1806.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

Francis II abdicated the imperial title on the 6th of August 1806, six weeks after sixteen princes had left to form Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine, and with a French ultimatum on the table. Napoleon was the immediate cause.

But the Empire had been dismantling itself for a decade. The Peace of Lunéville in 1801 ceded the entire left bank of the Rhine. The Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803 — the last significant act of the diet, and a word that deserves its length — then compensated the dispossessed princes by abolishing almost every ecclesiastical principality and all but six of the free imperial cities, and redistributing their lands. Something like a hundred and twelve territories vanished in a single instrument, voted through by the Empire's own institutions.

By 1806 there was little left to dissolve. Francis's abdication was a legal formality performed to stop Napoleon claiming the title himself.

Nobody mourned it.

Mostly false

Hegel wrote that Germany was no longer a state, and the nationalist historians of the following century treated 1806 as a merciful release from an obstacle to unification.

That is not how it looked to the small territories. For a free city, an imperial knight, an abbess ruling a convent principality or a Jewish community holding an imperial charter, the Empire was the guarantor that a larger neighbour could not simply absorb them — and after 1806, larger neighbours simply did. Goethe recorded that the news of the dissolution caused less stir in his household than an argument between the coachman and a servant, and then noted with some care how much had been lost with it.

Jewish communities in particular had relied on imperial protection, held directly from the emperor as Kammerknechte, and the protection was imperfect but real. Its removal left them at the mercy of the states that inherited them.

The Empire had a capital.

False

It never had one, and the absence is structural rather than accidental.

Government was itinerant: the court moved between imperial palaces, consuming the local surplus and dispensing justice as it went, because a fixed capital would have required a tax base the emperor did not have. Aachen crowned; Frankfurt elected; Nuremberg held the regalia and the first diet; Regensburg housed the perpetual diet after 1663; Speyer and later Wetzlar held the Imperial Chamber Court; Vienna held the Aulic Council and, from the fifteenth century, the emperor himself.

That distribution was a feature. No single city could be seized to take the Empire, and no dynasty could turn its own capital into the Empire's. It is also why there is no obvious place to go and see it, and why this volume's travel guide covers four countries.

The Reformation split it in half and it never recovered.

Mostly false

The Reformation began inside the Empire and was protected by it: Luther survived because Frederick the Wise of Saxony was an imperial elector whom Charles V could not simply overrule, and because the safe-conduct to Worms was honoured, unlike Hus's at Constance.

The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 then produced a settlement — cuius regio, eius religio, the ruler determines the confession — that was crude, excluded Calvinists, and held for sixty-three years. Westphalia in 1648 extended it to Calvinists and froze confessional ownership at the position of 1624.

After that the Empire ran as a formally bi-confessional state, with the diet dividing into Catholic and Protestant benches for religious questions and requiring agreement between them rather than a majority. It was cumbersome and it worked. Europe produced no other constitutional answer to the confessional problem that lasted as long.

It was a thousand-year Reich.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

The arithmetic depends on where you start. From Otto I's coronation in 962 to Francis II's abdication in 1806 is eight hundred and forty-four years, which is what this volume counts and what most historians use. From Charlemagne in 800 it is a thousand and six.

The phrase itself is the problem. The Nazi regime called itself the Third Reich, counting the medieval Empire as the first and the Hohenzollern empire of 1871–1918 as the second, and promised a thousand years. The scheme was borrowed from Arthur Moeller van den Bruck's book of 1923 and has no standing before that.

The medieval Empire was elective, multi-ethnic, decentralised, constitutionally constrained and legally pluralist — close to the opposite of what claimed descent from it in 1933. Using the same word for both is the single most damaging thing that has happened to its reputation.