Yugoslavia was always going to fall apart.
Mostly false
It lasted seventy-three years in two forms and was, through the 1960s and 1970s, a functioning state with a rising standard of living, open borders, a reputation abroad out of all proportion to its size, and — on the survey evidence that exists — a population that identified as Yugoslav rather than as anything else.
The retrospective inevitability is an artefact of knowing how it ended. In 1985 almost nobody predicted war; the Western intelligence assessments of the late 1980s expected turbulence and not dissolution.
What can be said is that the structure carried specific unresolved problems: republic borders drawn in 1945 as administrative lines that left large minorities on the wrong side; an economy devolved to the republics in ways that made every economic argument a national one; a constitution in 1974 that decentralised so far that the federal government could barely act; and a leader whose personal authority substituted for institutions and who died in 1980 without a successor.
Add to that a decade of debt crisis and IMF austerity, a collapse of the party's legitimating ideology across Eastern Europe after 1989, and a politician in Serbia who discovered that nationalism could replace communism as a route to power. The outcome was contingent on all of them, and several could have gone differently.
The wars were caused by ancient ethnic hatreds.
False
This was the most influential wrong idea of the 1990s and it had consequences, because it supplied Western governments with a reason not to intervene: if the Balkans had been killing each other for five hundred years, nothing could be done.
The evidence is against it. Yugoslavia's peoples share a language — Serbo-Croat, now called four things — and the differences are of religion and historical empire rather than of ethnicity. Intermarriage in Bosnia ran at well over a quarter of urban marriages and in Sarajevo at more than a third. The census category "Yugoslav" was chosen by over a million people in 1981. Bosnian villages had been mixed for centuries.
The violence of 1941–45 was real and terrible and is the strongest card the ancient-hatreds argument holds — but it was the work of occupying powers and their local auxiliaries in a collapsed state, and the forty-five years afterwards were peaceful.
What actually happened in 1990–92 is documented in detail: politicians with control of republican media conducted deliberate campaigns to persuade populations that their neighbours were a threat, paramilitaries were armed and moved into mixed areas, and violence was organised from above. Reporting from the time shows people repeatedly astonished that it was happening to them. The phrase historians use is ethnic cleansing as a policy instrument, which is a description of a decision rather than of a condition.
Tito was Russian, or a Soviet agent.
False
Josip Broz was born in Kumrovec in Croatia in 1892 to a Croat father and a Slovene mother, worked as a metalworker, was conscripted into the Austro-Hungarian army, was captured by the Russians in 1915 and spent five years in Russia including the revolution — which is where the rumour comes from.
He returned in 1920, rose through an illegal Communist Party, spent time in Moscow in the 1930s during the purges in which most of the Yugoslav party leadership was shot, and became general secretary in 1937 largely because the alternatives were dead.
The Soviet-agent theory has a second source: Tito led the only communist movement in Europe that took power without the Red Army, and then broke with Stalin in 1948 and survived. Moscow's response included assassination attempts, to which Tito is reported to have sent a note saying that if Stalin did not stop sending killers he would send one to Moscow and would not need to send a second.
The nickname's origin is disputed — the two most repeated explanations, an abbreviation of a Serbo-Croat phrase or two Croatian words meaning this and that, are both folk etymologies. It was a party alias, adopted in the 1930s when everybody had one.
Yugoslavia was a Soviet satellite.
False
It was expelled from the Cominform in June 1948 and spent the following four decades as the most independent communist state in Europe.
The consequences were concrete. Yugoslavia received American aid from 1951 and bought Western weapons. Its citizens held passports and could travel and work abroad — around a million were Gastarbeiter in West Germany and elsewhere by the 1970s, and their remittances were a major part of the balance of payments. It had a market element, private smallholdings, and worker self-management rather than Soviet central planning. It was not in the Warsaw Pact and was not in NATO.
It also founded and led the Non-Aligned Movement with Nehru and Nasser, which by the 1970s had over ninety members, and its army's doctrine of Total National Defence was built explicitly around resisting a Soviet invasion, with weapons caches and territorial defence units across the country.
The break was not ideological in origin. Stalin wanted control over Yugoslav foreign policy, particularly over Albania and the Greek civil war, and Tito would not concede it. The purge that followed inside Yugoslavia, of anyone suspected of Soviet sympathies, produced Goli Otok.
Yugoslav socialism was an economic failure from the start.
Partly true, but more complicated than that
Between 1953 and 1965 Yugoslavia's growth rate was among the highest in the world — a real annual rate of around eight per cent — and the country moved from a largely peasant economy to an industrial one within a generation. Living standards, consumer goods, car ownership and foreign travel were all far beyond anything in the Warsaw Pact.
The system's defects were structural and they emerged later. Worker councils voted for wages over investment. Enterprises were soft-budget-constrained: an unprofitable factory was a political problem rather than a commercial one, and was refinanced. The 1965 reforms devolved banking to the republics, so that capital allocation became a national competition, and investment duplicated capacity because each republic wanted its own.
Then the borrowing. Through the 1970s Yugoslavia took on foreign debt on favourable terms; when interest rates rose at the end of the decade the servicing cost rose with them, and the 1980s were a decade of IMF austerity, falling real wages, and inflation that reached over 1,000 per cent by 1989.
Ante Marković's reform programme in 1989–90 actually worked — it stopped the inflation and he was briefly the most popular politician in the country — and it was destroyed by the republics helping themselves to the federal monetary system, Serbia's raid on the federal reserves in December 1990 being the most flagrant instance.
The siege of Sarajevo was the longest in history.
Mostly false
It was 1,425 days, from the 5th of April 1992 to the 29th of February 1996, and it is usually described as the longest siege of a capital city in modern warfare — which is a careful formulation that is defensible.
The unqualified version is not. Leningrad was besieged for 872 days and killed something over 800,000 people. Candia on Crete was besieged by the Ottomans for twenty-one years, from 1648 to 1669, which is the longest in recorded history and appears in this series' Venice volume. Ceuta was blockaded for longer still.
What was distinctive about Sarajevo was its visibility and its nature: a European capital with an international press corps in it, besieged for four years within flying distance of every Western capital, with the encircling forces on ridges overlooking the streets and a United Nations force present throughout under a mandate that did not permit it to lift the siege.
Around 11,000 people were killed in the city, including over 1,500 children. Roughly 5,000 people were killed by snipers and shelling of civilians in the open. The Markale market shellings of 1994 and 1995 killed 68 and 43 people respectively, and the second of them triggered the NATO air campaign that ended the war.
All Serbs supported Milošević.
False
He never won a majority of the total electorate, faced continuous domestic opposition, and was ultimately removed by a Serbian popular uprising.
The opposition was and persistent: the demonstrations of March 1991, in which tanks were deployed in central Belgrade; the Vidovdan protests; the three-month protest of 1996–97 after the annulment of local election results, which brought hundreds of thousands onto the streets nightly through a winter; Radio B92 and the independent press; the Women in Black, who stood in Belgrade squares protesting against the wars in Serbia's name; and Otpor, the student movement whose organising model was subsequently studied and exported.
Around 200,000 people left Serbia during the 1990s, including a large part of the professional class, many specifically to avoid conscription. Tens of thousands of men deserted or evaded the draft in 1991.
He fell on the 5th of October 2000, when the federal election he had lost and tried to annul produced a general strike and a march on the federal parliament. He was handed to the Hague tribunal in 2001 and died in custody in 2006 before judgement.
The same qualification belongs to Tuđman's Croatia and to every other party here, and it is the reason this volume avoids the collective singular.
NATO's 1999 bombing was straightforwardly illegal.
Partly true, but more complicated than that
It was conducted without a United Nations Security Council resolution authorising force, because Russia and China would have vetoed one. On a strict reading of the Charter, which permits force only in self-defence or with Council authorisation, that makes it unlawful, and a great many international lawyers say so.
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, chaired by Richard Goldstone, reported in 2000 with the formulation that has been quoted ever since: the intervention was illegal but legitimate. It found that the campaign was unlawful in the absence of Council authorisation and justified by the scale of the ethnic cleansing it interrupted.
The campaign itself is separately criticisable. Seventy-eight days of bombing killed around 500 civilians by Human Rights Watch's count; the targets included the Serbian state television building, killing sixteen employees, and the Chinese embassy, hit in error. Expulsions of Kosovo Albanians accelerated sharply after the bombing began, which is either evidence that it was counter-productive or that it triggered a plan already prepared, and both readings have serious defenders.
The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, adopted at the UN in 2005, was a response to the gap this episode exposed. Its subsequent use in Libya in 2011 is why several states now regard the whole framework with suspicion.
The international community stopped the war.
Partly true, but more complicated than that
It eventually did, after three and a half years in which its performance was among the worst of the post-war period.
The arms embargo of September 1991 applied to the whole of Yugoslavia and therefore froze in place an enormous advantage for the Bosnian Serbs, who had inherited the JNA's weapons. The safe areas declared in 1993 were not given the troops or the mandate to defend them, and Srebrenica was one of them. The UNPROFOR mandate permitted self-defence and the protection of aid convoys, which meant peacekeepers watched.
The Dutch battalion at Potočari in July 1995 was outnumbered, without air support after requests were mishandled, and stood aside while the men were separated. A Dutch government fell over it in 2002 and Dutch courts have found the state partly liable.
What ended the Bosnian war was a combination: the Croatian offensive in August 1995 that took the Krajina and displaced some 200,000 Serbs, NATO's Operation Deliberate Force after the second Markale shelling, and American diplomacy at Dayton in November.
The Hague tribunal, whatever its critics say, indicted 161 people, convicted 90 including heads of state and army commanders, and established a documentary record that denial has to work around rather than through.
Yugoslavia still exists in some form.
False
The name went in 2003. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, created by Serbia and Montenegro in 1992, renamed itself the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro that year, and Montenegro voted for independence by a narrow margin in 2006. Kosovo declared independence in 2008.
Seven states now hold the territory: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo. Slovenia and Croatia are in the European Union; the others are at various stages of not being.
What persists is not a state. It is a language that four countries call by different names and whose speakers understand each other completely; a shared popular culture of music and television that crosses every border; football rivalries that predate the wars; a common legal inheritance; and the term Yugonostalgia, which is used both affectionately and as an insult.
There is also a generation now in its twenties with no memory of any of it, for whom the federation is as remote as Austria-Hungary was to their grandparents — which is the ordinary fate of vanished countries, and the reason this series exists.
The spomeniks are mysterious abandoned monuments to nothing in particular.
False
Every one of them marks a specific event, and most of them mark a massacre.
The photographs that made them internationally famous after 2010 — Jan Kempenaers's series, and the online circulation that followed — presented them as abstract concrete objects in empty landscapes, frequently captioned as alien, futuristic or abandoned. They were none of those things at the time: they were built by a state that funded them properly, visited by school parties in millions, and integrated into a civic calendar.
The abstraction was a deliberate political choice. A monument at Kozara commemorating an offensive in which tens of thousands of civilians were deported to Jasenovac had to be legible to Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks simultaneously, so it could carry no religious or national iconography at all. That is why the forms are geometric — and why, after 1991, they turned out to belong to a country that no longer existed and therefore to no ministry with a maintenance budget.
Some have been stripped for scrap metal, some deliberately damaged because of whose dead they commemorate, some restored. Donald Niebyl's database documents several hundred of them with their histories attached, which is the correct way to look at them and takes about five minutes longer than not doing so.