Mythbusters

Eleven things
people get wrong
about Venice.

No city on earth has been written about more and understood less. The republic worked hard on its own legend, and a great deal of what everyone knows is that legend still operating.

17 min read

Venice is built on wooden piles that have petrified.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

The piles are real and the petrification is not. Venetian buildings stand on trunks — alder, oak, larch and elm, mostly from the forests of the Cadore and Istria — driven through the mud in their millions and capped with a raft of timber and then stone. The Salute is said to sit on something over a million of them.

They survive because they are permanently submerged in oxygen-poor brackish mud, in which the bacteria and fungi that rot wood cannot work. The timber is still wood: waterlogged, compressed, mineral-infiltrated at the surface, but not stone. Piles pulled up during restorations look like wood and can be cut.

The real foundation is not the piles anyway but the caranto, a compact clay layer a few metres down that actually bears the load. The piles transfer weight to it and stabilise the silt above.

What does threaten the buildings is the opposite of rot: groundwater extraction in the twentieth century caused subsidence, and boat wash and rising sea levels erode the brick above the waterline, where the tide wets and dries it. Venice is not sinking into its own decayed timber. It is being ground down at the waterline while the sea comes up.

The Bridge of Sighs is named for the sighs of condemned prisoners.

False

The name is Byron's, from Childe Harold's Pilgrimage in 1812 — "I stood in Venice, on the Bridge of Sighs" — and the romantic reading he attached to it has been repeated ever since.

The bridge was built around 1600 to connect the interrogation rooms in the Doge's Palace to the new prison across the canal. By then the republic's judicial procedure had ceased to produce the sort of prisoner Byron imagined; the people crossing it were mostly petty offenders going to short sentences, and the serious political prisoners had been held in the palace itself, in the piombi under the lead roof — from which Casanova escaped in 1756, the only person known to have done so.

The Venetian state's reputation for mass judicial terror is itself largely an invention of its enemies and of the eighteenth-century Gothic imagination. The Council of Ten's records survive and show a body that executed relatively few people and was, by the standards of contemporary European states, restrained, procedural and slow.

The other legend attached to the bridge — that couples who kiss under it at sunset stay together forever — comes from a 1979 film.

The Council of Ten was a secret tribunal of masked judges.

Mostly false

It was a standing committee of the Senate, established in 1310 after the Querini-Tiepolo conspiracy, with responsibility for state security. Its members were elected for one year, could not serve consecutive terms, could not include two men from the same family, and their names were known.

It worked in closed session and it had real powers — it could arrest, try and execute without appeal — and it made the republic's intelligence service one of the most effective in Europe. The bocche di leone, the lion's-mouth letterboxes for denunciations, are still in the walls. But anonymous accusations were not acted on unless corroborated; the procedure required evidence and produced written records, which survive.

The masks and the black cloaks belong to the eighteenth-century Gothic novel and to nineteenth-century historical fiction, and they took hold because the republic's enemies — Rome after the interdicts, and the propagandists of every state that lost a war to it — had an interest in the picture and because Venice, oddly, never much bothered to correct it.

What the Ten genuinely did that deserves criticism is run a system of informers, censor printing, and, on occasion, order assassinations abroad. That is a real charge and it is a different one.

The doge was essentially a king.

False

He was an elected head of state hedged about with constraints designed, over eight centuries, by people who had watched what happened when he was not.

The election procedure alone is evidence of the anxiety: from 1268 the Great Council chose thirty by lot, reduced them to nine by lot, those nine elected forty, reduced by lot to twelve, who elected twenty-five, reduced to nine, who elected forty-five, reduced to eleven, who elected the forty-one who chose the doge. Ten alternating rounds of lot and ballot, specifically to make bribery and faction impossible to organise.

Once elected he swore a promissione ducale, rewritten and tightened at each accession, which by the later period forbade him to meet foreign envoys alone, open official correspondence unaccompanied, hold property outside the republic, engage in trade, permit his sons to hold certain offices, or leave the city without permission. After his death a commission reviewed his conduct and his estate could be fined.

Two doges attempted to break out. Marin Falier was beheaded in 1355; his portrait space in the Great Council is a black cloth. Francesco Foscari was forced to abdicate in 1457 and died days later.

The office was real power exercised inside a cage, and it lasted 1,100 years — 120 doges — which is the longest run of any elective head of state in European history.

Venice was a peaceful trading republic, not a colonial empire.

False

It was a maritime empire that governed several hundred thousand people who had not chosen it, for up to six centuries, and it fought more or less continuously to do so.

The Stato da Mar ran from Istria down the Dalmatian coast, across the Ionian islands, into the Aegean and Crete and Cyprus. Crete was Venetian for 464 years and revolted against Venetian rule at least a dozen times; the 1363 rising of the St Titus revolt, in which Venetian colonists joined the Greeks, was suppressed with considerable violence. Cyprus was acquired in 1489 by the manoeuvred abdication of a Venetian-born queen and lost to the Ottomans in 1571, with the commander of Famagusta flayed alive after surrendering on terms.

The Fourth Crusade is the sharpest case. In 1204 a crusading army in Venetian ships, under a Venetian doge of about eighty who was blind, sacked Constantinople — the largest Christian city in the world — over three days, and Venice took three-eighths of the Byzantine Empire and a great deal of portable art, including the horses on the basilica.

Venice also traded slaves, extensively, for centuries. The traffic ran from the Black Sea and the Balkans to Egypt and the Levant, and it was enough that the republic's own ban on Christians trading in Christian slaves had to be reissued repeatedly, which tells you how well it was observed.

Venice ran the medieval Mediterranean slave trade.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

Venice was a major participant in it and not its proprietor, and the correction matters because the trade is frequently either erased from accounts of the republic or exaggerated into a monopoly.

The traffic was real and long-running. Venetian merchants bought captives — Slavs from the Balkans, and from the thirteenth century Circassians, Georgians, Tatars and others through the Black Sea colonies — and sold them, principally to Egypt, where the Mamluk state bought military slaves systematically. Domestic slavery within Venice itself existed on a modest scale, mostly household servants.

Genoa was at least as deeply involved, and probably more so in the Black Sea, where Caffa was the principal market; Catalan, Sicilian and Muslim merchants all traded in the same commodity. The papacy repeatedly banned the sale of Christians to Muslims and the bans were repeatedly ignored.

What Venice did possess uniquely was scale and organisation — the ships, the contracts, the insurance, the consular network — and it applied them to this trade as to every other. The English word slave and the Italian schiavo derive from the medieval Latin for Slav, and the etymology is a fossil of exactly this commerce.

Marco Polo brought pasta back from China.

False

Pasta was being eaten in Italy before he was born. The Arab geographer al-Idrisi describes a dried string pasta, itriyya, being manufactured at Trabia in Sicily around 1154 and exported in quantity — over a century before Polo's journey. Genoese inventories from the 1270s list macaroni.

The story is an invention of the 1920s, and specifically of an American trade journal, The Macaroni Journal, which ran a fabricated anecdote in 1929 about a sailor named Spaghetti. It spread because it is a good story and because the alternative history — pasta arriving in Sicily with the Arabs — was less appealing to some tellers.

While we are here: the book is not by Marco Polo either, exactly. Il Milione was dictated in a Genoese prison in 1298 to Rustichello of Pisa, a professional writer of Arthurian romance, who had views about how a narrative should be shaped. Whether Polo reached China at all has been questioned — he does not mention tea, foot-binding or the Great Wall — but the balance of scholarly opinion holds that he did, and that the omissions say more about his informants and his co-author than about his itinerary.

Lepanto ended the Ottoman threat in the Mediterranean.

Mostly false

On the 7th of October 1571 the Holy League fleet destroyed the Ottoman fleet off western Greece: some 200 Ottoman galleys taken or sunk, perhaps 30,000 dead, and around 12,000 Christian galley slaves freed. It was the largest naval battle in the Mediterranean since antiquity and the last great engagement fought principally with oars.

It settled very little. The Ottomans rebuilt within a year — the grand vizier's remark to the Venetian envoy, that in taking Cyprus the Turks had cut off an arm while at Lepanto the Christians had shaved a beard, is as accurate as it is famous — and by 1573 Venice made a separate peace, conceded Cyprus permanently and paid an indemnity. The Ottomans took Tunis in 1574.

What Lepanto did was psychological and it was not trivial: it broke a conviction that the Ottoman navy could not be beaten. Cervantes fought there and lost the use of his left hand, and called it the greatest occasion the past or present has seen.

Venice's own trajectory after it is the better measure. The republic lost Cyprus in 1571, Crete after 1669, and the Morea in 1715, and fought its last Ottoman war as a third-rate power. The Mediterranean's centre of gravity had in any case moved: the Atlantic routes to Asia and the Americas were already draining the Levant trade that Venice existed on.

Venice declined because Vasco da Gama found the route to India.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

The Portuguese arrival in Calicut in 1498 caused real alarm in Venice — the diarist Girolamo Priuli wrote that it would be the ruin of the city — and the spice trade did shift.

But not immediately and not completely. The Levant route through Alexandria and Aleppo recovered strongly in the middle of the sixteenth century and for several decades carried as much pepper as the Cape route; Portuguese logistics were not as good as the fright suggested, and Venetian merchants adapted. The republic's manufacturing — glass, textiles, printing, shipbuilding, soap — also grew in this period, and Venice in 1550 was richer than Venice in 1450.

The decline was slower, later and more various: the loss of the eastern colonies to the Ottomans, the shift of European economic weight to the Atlantic states, the plague of 1630 which killed perhaps a third of the city, the rise of Dutch and English shipping which could carry cargo more cheaply, and an increasingly closed patrician class that put its capital into mainland estates and villas rather than into voyages.

By the eighteenth century Venice was a wealthy, ornamental, militarily irrelevant state living on tourism, gambling and carnival — which is a recognisable condition and arguably not the worst way to spend a century.

Napoleon conquered Venice.

Mostly false

He threatened it and it surrendered. There was no siege and effectively no fighting.

In the spring of 1797 the French army was in the Veneto and Bonaparte, needing Venetian territory as a bargaining counter against Austria, manufactured a quarrel. On the 12th of May the Great Council met for the last time, voted 512 to 20 with 5 abstentions to dissolve the constitution and hand power to a provisional municipality, and the last doge, Ludovico Manin, took off the ducal cap and gave it to his servant with the remark that he would not be needing it again.

The republic was 1,100 years old and it ended in an afternoon by a vote of its own governing body under duress. The French entered on the 16th of May, looted the Arsenale, burned the Bucintoro for its gold leaf, took the bronze horses to Paris — they came back in 1815 — and in October traded the whole territory to Austria in the Treaty of Campo Formio in exchange for Lombardy and a free hand elsewhere.

That is the part Venetians have never forgotten: the city was not defeated in battle, it was surrendered and then sold, within five months, by a man who had no intention of keeping it.

Venice will be underwater within fifty years.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

The threat is real, the timeline in the headlines usually is not, and the more immediate danger to the city is demographic rather than hydrological.

The mechanics: the lagoon floor subsided by roughly 12 centimetres in the twentieth century, much of it from groundwater extraction for the Marghera industrial zone, which was stopped in the 1970s. Relative sea level has risen about 30 centimetres since 1900. The acqua alta of November 2019 reached 187 centimetres, the second-highest on record after 1966. The MOSE flood barriers, begun in 2003, delivered a decade late and several times over budget amid a corruption scandal that took down the mayor, have been operational since 2020 and have closed successfully many times. They protect against surge; they do not address long-term mean sea-level rise, and the more often they close the more the lagoon's ecology and the port suffer.

The other number is the one residents talk about. The historic centre's population has fallen from about 175,000 in 1951 to under 50,000 today, while overnight visitors run into the tens of millions a year. The city introduced a day-tripper entry fee in 2024.

Venice is not going to be abandoned to the sea in fifty years. It is in real danger of becoming a place with no Venetians in it, which is a different kind of ending and closer to hand.