Hitler was elected.
False
He was never elected to anything. The Nazi Party's best result in a free election was 37.3% in July 1932, and it fell back to 33.1% that November. Hitler stood for the presidency in 1932 and lost to Hindenburg by 53% to 37%.
He was appointed chancellor on the 30th of January 1933 by President Hindenburg, in a deal brokered by Franz von Papen and a small circle of conservatives who believed they could use him and contain him. Papen took the vice-chancellorship and told a doubter that within two months they would have pushed Hitler so far into a corner that he would squeak.
The distinction matters because the alternative story — that Germany voted for this — is both false and comforting. What actually happened is that a minority party was handed power by an establishment that preferred it to the left, and then destroyed every institution capable of removing it within seven months.
The Nazis built the autobahns.
Mostly false
The first purpose-built motorway in Germany, the Cologne–Bonn road, opened in 1932, under Konrad Adenauer as mayor. The network had been planned through the 1920s by the HaFraBa association, and the route maps the regime used were largely drawn before it took power.
What the regime did was take the plan, brand it as the Führer's roads, and publicise the construction relentlessly as evidence that the unemployment problem was being solved. About 3,800 kilometres were built by 1941. It employed perhaps 120,000 men at its peak — significant, but a small fraction of the six million unemployed in 1933, and far less important to the recovery than rearmament was.
The roads were also of limited military use. The Wehrmacht moved by rail and by horse; Germany had fewer motor vehicles per head than Britain or France throughout the period.
The Wehrmacht was clean; the crimes were the SS's.
False
This is the most consequential myth in the list, and it was constructed deliberately. Surviving German generals — Manstein, Halder and others — wrote memoirs in the late 1940s and 1950s that separated a professional, honourable army from a criminal party apparatus. The Western allies, rearming West Germany against the Soviet Union, found the story convenient and did not press it.
The documentary record does not support it. The Commissar Order of June 1941 instructed regular army units to shoot captured Soviet political officers, and it was widely obeyed. The army administered the occupied east, in which some 3.3 million Soviet prisoners of war died of deliberate starvation and exposure. Army units carried out reprisal shootings of civilians, supported Einsatzgruppen operations, and requisitioned food from populations known to be starving.
A travelling exhibition on Wehrmacht crimes toured Germany from 1995 and caused enormous public argument. That argument is now largely settled among historians.
Ordinary Germans did not know.
False
They knew a great deal, if not everything. The camps inside Germany were public knowledge from 1933 — Dachau's opening was reported in the press as a warning. The boycott of Jewish shops in April 1933, the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, the November pogrom of 1938 with its burned synagogues and 30,000 arrests, and the deportations from German cities from 1941 were all conducted openly, in daylight, in front of neighbours who then acquired the furniture.
The killing in the east was more distant, but far from secret. Soldiers wrote home; some sent photographs. The BBC German service broadcast details from 1942. Goebbels complained in his diary about rumours circulating. Bishop von Galen preached publicly against the murder of the disabled in 1941, and the programme was formally halted — which demonstrated that public objection could work, and how rarely it was tried.
What most people had was not ignorance but the ability not to inquire.
The Nazis were socialists — it is in the name.
Mostly false
The name was chosen in 1920 to recruit from the working class, and the party's early programme contained anti-capitalist planks. Those planks were abandoned as soon as they became inconvenient. The wing that took them seriously — Gregor Strasser's, and the SA under Röhm — was destroyed in the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934, with Strasser and Röhm both shot.
In office the regime banned independent trade unions in May 1933 and imprisoned their leaders, abolished collective bargaining, privatised state holdings in steel, banking and shipping on a scale unusual for the period, and delivered large profits to the industrial firms that cooperated with rearmament. Wages were held down; company owners were made Betriebsführer, leaders of their plants, with corresponding authority over their workers.
There was extensive state direction of the economy, particularly after 1936. That is a description of a war economy, not of socialism, and Germany's business elite understood the difference perfectly well at the time.
The economy was a miracle, whatever else you say.
False
Unemployment did fall sharply, from about six million in 1933 to near zero by 1938. A good deal of that was real, and a good deal was accounting: women pushed out of the workforce were not counted, conscription absorbed hundreds of thousands, and Jews removed from employment were not counted either.
The financing was fraudulent. Rearmament was paid for with Mefo bills — promissory notes issued by a shell company, kept off the government's books, and rolled over rather than redeemed. By 1938 the bills were coming due, foreign exchange reserves were nearly exhausted, and consumer goods were short.
Hjalmar Schacht, who invented the scheme, warned that the state was heading for bankruptcy and was removed from the economics ministry in 1937. The regime's answer to the problem was plunder: Austria's gold reserves in 1938, Czechoslovakia's in 1939, and then the systematic looting of occupied Europe. An economy that requires conquest to stay solvent is not a miracle.
The swastika was a Nazi symbol.
Mostly false
The symbol is at least five thousand years old and appears independently across Eurasia — on Indus Valley seals, in Greek and Roman decoration, in Byzantine and medieval Christian ornament, on Native American work, and as an auspicious mark in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, where it remains in everyday religious use by well over a billion people.
It arrived in German nationalist circles in the late nineteenth century through the völkisch movement, which had convinced itself the symbol was specifically Aryan. The party adopted it in 1920, tilted at forty-five degrees on a white disc and red ground — a design Hitler claimed personally, and which was chosen partly because red would appeal to workers.
The tilt is the useful distinction. Display of the tilted party version is illegal in Germany and Austria outside historical, artistic and educational contexts; the upright religious symbol is a different thing entirely, and travellers in Asia should not confuse the two.
Rommel was the good German.
Partly true, but more complicated than that
Rommel commanded in North Africa, a theatre with no extermination programme and comparatively few atrocities, and he did refuse the Commando Order instructing that captured commandos be shot. He appears not to have passed on orders to kill Jewish prisoners. British propaganda built him into a chivalrous opponent during the war because it flattered the enemy Britain was losing to, and West Germany later needed a soldier it could name a barracks after.
Against that: he owed his career to Hitler's direct patronage, commanded the Führer's escort battalion, accepted promotions over more senior men, and was an enthusiastic and public supporter of the regime well into the war. His involvement in the 20th of July plot was peripheral at most; he was named under interrogation, and was given the choice of suicide with a state funeral or a trial that would destroy his family. He took the poison on the 14th of October 1944.
He was not a resister. He was a talented general who served the regime loyally until it was clearly losing, which describes a great many people.
Germany nearly won the war.
Mostly false
There were moments — the summer of 1940, the approach to Moscow in December 1941 — when a different outcome looked possible, and the fighting was in earnest. But the structural position was bad from the moment the war widened.
Germany had no significant oil of its own and depended on Romanian fields and synthetic production. Its economy was roughly a third the size of the combined Allied economies by 1942. It never built a strategic bomber force, never solved the problem of transport at scale, and used horses for the majority of its haulage to the end. In 1943 the United States built more aircraft than Germany, Italy and Japan combined.
The invasion of the Soviet Union was undertaken without winter clothing because the campaign was expected to end in ten weeks, and the declaration of war on the United States four days after Pearl Harbor was gratuitous. The regime lost the war for reasons that were visible in 1941 to anyone counting.
It could not happen again, because we would recognise it.
False
This is the myth the documentation centres in Munich, Berlin and Nuremberg were all built to attack, and it is the reason they emphasise the boring parts.
What actually happened between January and July 1933 was procedural. The Reichstag Fire Decree of the 28th of February suspended civil liberties under an emergency clause of the existing constitution. The Enabling Act of the 23rd of March, passed by a parliament from which communist deputies had already been arrested, transferred legislative power to the cabinet — and it was voted through by the Centre Party in exchange for guarantees that were never honoured. The civil service was purged by a law in April. The unions were dissolved in May, the other parties in June and July. Every step had a legal instrument behind it.
Nobody in Germany in 1933 was looking at a swastika and seeing 1945. They were looking at a coalition government, an emergency, and a promise that the emergency measures were temporary. That is what it looked like from inside, and that is why the exhibitions dwell on it.