Mythbusters

Eleven things
people get wrong
about Gran Colombia.

Six countries teach this republic as their own founding myth, and each of them needs a slightly different version of it. The result is a man quoted by everybody and read by almost nobody.

17 min read

The country was called Gran Colombia.

False

It was called the Republic of Colombia. That is the name in the Fundamental Law of Angostura of December 1819, in the Cúcuta constitution of 1821, on its coins and in its treaties, and it is what everyone alive at the time called it.

Gran Colombia is a retrospective label, coined by later historians to distinguish the union of 1819–1831 from the present-day Republic of Colombia, which took that name in 1886 after passing through three others. Nobody in the republic ever described themselves as a citizen of Gran Colombia.

The distinction matters more than it sounds. Calling it Gran Colombia makes it sound like a grander version of modern Colombia, which is exactly the reading Venezuelans and Ecuadorians object to. It was a new state with a new name, of which the present Colombia is one of three successors — not the original with two pieces missing.

Gran Colombia was Bolívar's dream of a single united South America.

Mostly false

Two quite different projects get merged here. The Republic of Colombia was a specific state with defined borders — modern Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama — and Bolívar wanted it unified and centrally governed. That is one thing.

The other is the Congress of Panama of 1826, which was not a proposal to merge the Spanish American republics into one country at all. It was a proposal for a league: a permanent confederation of separate sovereign states with common defence, common diplomacy and an arbitral assembly, rather closer to NATO plus a court than to a federation. Bolívar explicitly did not want a single continental state, and said in the Jamaica Letter of 1815 that the idea was magnificent and impossible, because the distances, the separate interests and the different characters of the regions made it unworkable.

He was also, by 1826, contemplating something narrower: an Andean federation of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia under his own life presidency. That project alarmed his allies more than his enemies, and contributed directly to the break-up of the country he actually had.

Bolívar freed the slaves.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

He did more than any other leader of the independence generation, and much less than the phrase implies.

The sequence: in exile in Haiti in 1816 he accepted Alexandre Pétion's terms — ships, arms, men and money in exchange for abolishing slavery in any territory he freed — and he proclaimed emancipation at Carúpano in June 1816. Enforcement was patchy and the offer was in practice a military recruitment measure, freeing men who enlisted. At Cúcuta in 1821 he pressed for full abolition and was refused by a congress of slaveholders, which passed instead a free-womb law: children born to enslaved women were free, but only on reaching eighteen, later raised to twenty-one, and in the meantime were bound to their mother's owner. Manumission juntas funded by a tax on inheritances were to buy freedom for the rest; they were starved of money and freed very few.

Slavery was finally abolished in Ecuador in 1851, in New Granada in 1851–52, and in Venezuela in 1854 — between twenty and twenty-four years after the republic dissolved, and a generation after the law of 1821.

Bolívar himself inherited several hundred enslaved people and freed those still his in 1821. He also wrote, more than once, that he feared a pardocracia — rule by the mixed-race majority — and the fear shaped his constitutional preferences to the end.

Bolívar was a democrat and a liberal.

Mostly false

He was a republican, an anti-monarchist and an abolitionist by the standards of his class, and he was not a democrat in any sense a modern reader would recognise, nor did he claim to be.

The documents are unambiguous. The Angostura Address of 1819 proposes a hereditary senate on the British model and a fourth branch of government, a "moral power", to supervise the citizens' virtue; the congress declined both. The Bolivian constitution he wrote in 1826 — which he considered his finest work — provides for a president for life with the right to nominate his own successor, a three-chamber legislature, and a franchise limited to the literate, in a country where literacy was in single figures. In August 1828 he suspended the Cúcuta constitution by decree, abolished the vice-presidency and assumed dictatorial powers.

His argument was consistent rather than cynical: that populations formed by three centuries of colonial rule had no experience of self-government, that federalism had destroyed the first Venezuelan and New Granadan republics, and that liberty had to be constructed before it could be exercised. Whether that is a diagnosis or an excuse has been the central argument about him for two hundred years. It is not, either way, liberalism.

The independence wars were a colonial people rising against Spain.

Mostly false

They were also, and in Venezuela primarily, a civil war within colonial society, along lines of class and race.

The first Venezuelan republic of 1811 was made by white Creole landowners and restricted the vote by property. The enslaved and the free mixed-race majority had no obvious stake in it, and a great many of them concluded that the Spanish crown — which at least maintained the legal categories that let free pardos sue, and which had shown some willingness to check the planters — was the better bet. When José Tomás Boves raised the llaneros in 1813 and 1814 he raised them against the republic, and his campaign of deliberate terror against whites destroyed it. Royalist armies in Venezuela were manned by pardos and by the enslaved.

The republicans won by reversing that. From 1816 Bolívar offered freedom for military service and Páez offered land and plunder, and the same cavalry changed sides. The proportion of the fighting done by Spaniards from Spain was small: Morillo's expedition of 1815 was the only large force sent from Europe, and most of the royalist war was fought by Americans against Americans.

It is worth adding what the war cost. Venezuela's population fell by something like a quarter between 1810 and 1825, which is a catastrophe on the scale of the worst of the European wars of the period, and very little of it was inflicted by Spain.

The United States supported the South American independence movements.

Mostly false

The United States stayed neutral until 1822, and its neutrality laws were enforced against republican privateers. Recognition came in 1822, after the fighting was won, and was driven by Henry Clay's congressional agitation rather than by the executive.

The Monroe Doctrine of December 1823 is routinely read backwards as a guarantee. It was a unilateral declaration with no force behind it — the United States Navy could not have stopped a European expedition and everyone knew it — and the actual deterrent to the Holy Alliance was the Royal Navy, which had its own reasons. Canning, the British foreign secretary, had proposed a joint declaration and was declined; he remarked afterwards that he had called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old, which was boastful but not baseless.

Bolívar was unsentimental about it. He declined to press the United States for anything much, excluded them from his first list of invitations to the Panama Congress, and wrote in 1829 that the United States seemed destined by Providence to plague the Americas with miseries in the name of liberty. Britain mattered more: the British and Irish legions, some six thousand volunteers who provided his only reliable infantry; the London loans of 1822 and 1824; and recognition in 1825.

Bolívar and San Martín's meeting at Guayaquil settled the fate of the continent.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

They met on the 26th and 27th of July 1822, alone, for perhaps four hours in total. San Martín left Peru within weeks, resigned everything, and sailed for Europe, never to return. Bolívar completed the war.

What is not known is why, because no reliable record of the conversation exists. The two men agreed to say nothing. What survives is a set of later accounts — a letter said to be from San Martín to Bolívar of August 1822, whose authenticity has been disputed for a century and a half; recollections written down decades afterwards by people who were not in the room; and national historiographies with a strong interest in a particular answer.

The standard theories are that San Martín asked for troops and was refused; that he proposed a constitutional monarchy and found Bolívar immovable; that he wanted the command and would not fight a fellow patriot for it; or that he simply judged, correctly, that there was room for only one of them and that Peru would be freed faster if he left. All are plausible; none is demonstrated.

What is certain is the annexation. Bolívar had already incorporated Guayaquil into Colombia before San Martín arrived, against a local party that wanted independence and another that wanted union with Peru, and the meeting took place in a city whose status had been settled by the man who owned the garrison.

Bolívar was murdered.

Unproven

He died at San Pedro Alejandrino on the 17th of December 1830. His physician, the Frenchman Alexandre Prosper Révérend, recorded the case in detail and diagnosed pulmonary tuberculosis, which fits the six-year course of the illness, the weight loss and the terminal presentation.

The murder theory has a long history and was revived as state policy in Venezuela in the 2000s. In 2010 the government exhumed the remains and a large forensic commission examined them. It reported that the evidence was not conclusive for arsenic poisoning as a cause of death. Elevated arsenic is not in itself surprising: arsenical preparations were standard medicine of the period and he had been treated for years.

A 2010 paper in a clinical journal proposed chronic arsenic poisoning from medication and water as a contributing factor, and another has suggested bronchiectasis or a fungal infection rather than tuberculosis. These are arguments about the pathology, not about assassination.

There is no contemporary evidence of a plot to poison him, and there is a simpler account available: a man of forty-seven who had spent twenty years campaigning in the tropics and the high Andes, who had been shot at, exiled, and politically destroyed within the same twelve months, died of a lung disease that killed a great many people in 1830.

The republic collapsed because Bolívar failed.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

His political judgement in the last four years was poor — the dictatorship of 1828 in particular converted a constitutional argument into a question of legitimacy that could only be answered by force — but the structural case against the republic was there from the start, and it is the more interesting half.

Geography first. The country ran from Panama to the Peruvian border across three Andean cordilleras and the Orinoco basin. A despatch from Bogotá to Caracas took roughly a month; to Quito, three weeks over passes at four thousand metres; the Magdalena, the only real artery, was navigable in stretches and took weeks. A centralist constitution was written for a territory that could not be centrally administered by any technology then available.

Then money. The republic financed the war with London loans in 1822 and 1824, on ruinous terms and with much of the proceeds never arriving; it defaulted in 1826, in the general crash that followed the South American investment bubble, and spent the rest of its existence unable to pay its army. An unpaid army in a country of caudillos is not a neutral fact.

Then the caudillos themselves: Páez in Venezuela, Flores in Ecuador, men whose authority rested on personal followings from the war and who were never going to be subordinated to a distant bureaucracy. And then the simple absence of any Colombian identity. People were Venezuelan, or from Quito, or New Granadan. Eleven years was not long enough to make them anything else.

Bolívar said “I have ploughed the sea.”

True

He did — in a letter to General Juan José Flores written from Barranquilla on the 9th of November 1830, five weeks before his death, and it is one of the bleakest documents in the political literature of the Americas.

The famous line comes in a list. He tells Flores that he has governed for twenty years and drawn from it only a few certainties: that America is ungovernable for us; that those who serve a revolution plough the sea; that the only thing to do in America is emigrate; that these countries will infallibly fall into the hands of the unbridled multitude and then pass to petty tyrants of every colour and race; and that if it were possible for any part of the world to return to primeval chaos, that would be America's last state.

It is genuine, and it is routinely quoted as though it were his verdict on his own achievement in a spirit of noble melancholy. Read whole, it is angrier and considerably less admirable than that — the judgement of a dying man on the people who had just removed him. The companion phrase that gets attached to him, that he was the man who had liberated half a continent and could not find a country to be buried in, is not his; he was buried in Santa Marta and moved to Caracas twelve years later.

The three successor countries have always agreed about their shared founder.

False

They have agreed on almost nothing about him except that he belongs to them.

Venezuela made him a state cult early and has never stopped: the remains repatriated in 1842, the pantheon of 1874, the country formally renamed the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in 1999, the exhumation of 2010, and a national ideology named after him. Colombia, whose republican tradition runs at least as much through Santander — the administrator Bolívar exiled after 1828, and the man Colombian liberals have generally preferred — is markedly cooler, and its nineteenth-century politics were a quarrel between Bolivarian and Santanderista inheritances. Ecuador's relationship is complicated by the fact that the union looked, from Quito, a good deal like being governed by Bogotá.

The borders they inherited produced real wars: Colombia and Venezuela over the Gulf and the Essequibo-adjacent claims, Peru and Ecuador over the Amazonian frontier three separate times in the twentieth century, the last as recently as 1995. Panama's separation in 1903 was a further subtraction.

The lesson the volume ends on is that the union's failure is not evidence that it was foolish. It is evidence that eleven years is not long enough to make a nation out of a war.