Mythbusters

Eleven things
people get wrong
about al-Andalus.

No subject in this series is more actively fought over in present-day politics, and the two loudest positions are both wrong. What follows tries to say what the evidence supports.

18 min read

Al-Andalus was a paradise of convivencia where three faiths lived as equals.

Mostly false

The three communities did coexist, productively and for centuries, and that is genuinely remarkable set against contemporary Latin Europe. They did not coexist as equals, and nobody at the time imagined they should.

Christians and Jews lived under the dhimma: protected, permitted their own law and worship, and subject to the jizya poll tax and to restrictions on building, public ritual, dress and legal testimony against Muslims. A dhimmi's word did not count against a Muslim's in court. Conversion out of Islam was capital.

The term convivencia was coined by Américo Castro in 1948, in an argument about Spanish national identity conducted under Franco, and it was polemical from the start. It has since been taken up by people who want al-Andalus to model religious pluralism, and its excesses are then used by people who want the whole thing to have been a tyranny.

What the evidence supports is something less usable by either side: a hierarchical, legally unequal, generally functional arrangement that produced extraordinary intellectual results, and that broke down badly at intervals — the martyrs of Córdoba in the 850s, the Granada massacre of 1066, the Almohad persecutions of the twelfth century that ended Christian and Jewish life in al-Andalus altogether.

Al-Andalus was a brutal occupation that systematically oppressed Christians.

Mostly false

This is the mirror image, and it fails on the same evidence.

Most of the Iberian population converted to Islam voluntarily over three centuries. Bulliet's chronology puts conversion at around twenty per cent by 800 and over half by 950; that is not the profile of a population held down by force. The conquest itself was accomplished partly by treaty — the Pact of Tudmir, in which a Visigothic lord kept seven towns, his authority and his religion in exchange for tribute, survives in full.

Christians under Muslim rule kept their bishops, their churches and their courts. Recemundus, a Christian, served as Abd al-Rahman III's ambassador to Otto I. The martyrs of Córdoba deliberately courted execution by publicly cursing Muhammad, a capital offence they knew about, and the local Christian hierarchy condemned the practice — which is the opposite of the pattern one sees under actual persecution.

Conditions were worse at some times than others, and they became genuinely intolerable under the Almohads after 1147, who gave Jews and Christians the choice of conversion, exile or death. That was a Berber reform movement from the Atlas, not the Umayyad caliphate this volume is about, and collapsing the two is how both of the competing myths get made.

The caliphal library held four hundred thousand books.

Unproven

The figure comes from later Arabic sources describing al-Hakam II's library, and it is repeated everywhere, sometimes inflated to a million. It cannot be verified and is probably an order of magnitude too high.

Some context. A very large monastic library in tenth-century Latin Europe held a few hundred volumes. The Abbasid libraries of Baghdad were the largest in the world and no reliable figure survives for them either. Four hundred thousand manuscript codices would require a copying industry of a size for which there is no other evidence, and a building nobody describes.

What is solid is that al-Hakam II was a serious bibliophile who employed agents across the Islamic world to buy books, that Córdoba had a paper industry — paper reached al-Andalus from the east via Játiva, centuries before Latin Europe used it — and that the library was large enough to be famous. A catalogue is reported to have run to forty-four volumes.

It is also gone. The library was purged of philosophical works under al-Mansur to placate the religious scholars, and dispersed entirely in the civil war after 1009. Whatever the number, none of it survives as a collection.

The Reconquista was a single continuous eight-hundred-year crusade.

False

The word Reconquista is a nineteenth-century coinage, and the thing it describes was neither continuous nor consistently religious.

For most of the period the northern kingdoms fought each other as readily as they fought Muslims, and alliances crossed the religious line constantly. Sancho of Castile allied with the Zaragoza taifa; El Cid — Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, whose title comes from the Arabic sayyid — served the Muslim king of Zaragoza for years before taking Valencia for himself. The taifa kings paid parias, tribute, to Christian rulers for protection against other Muslims, which financed the Romanesque building boom in the north.

The rhythm was also nothing like continuous. Toledo fell in 1085; then a century and a half in which the Almoravids and Almohads reversed much of it. Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 broke the Almohads and Córdoba, Valencia and Seville fell within forty years — and then Granada survived for another two hundred and fifty, as a tributary state, with Castile content to take its gold.

It became a religious war retrospectively, in the chronicles and then in nineteenth-century nationalism and again under Franco, who made it a founding myth of his regime. That is why the word carries so much freight.

The Spanish Inquisition was created to persecute Muslims.

False

It was created in 1478 with jurisdiction over baptised Christians only, and its original target was conversos — Jews who had converted, largely under the pressure of the massacres of 1391 — suspected of secretly maintaining Jewish practice.

That distinction is the whole mechanism. The Inquisition had no authority over practising Jews or Muslims, because they were not Christians and therefore could not be heretics. The way it acquired jurisdiction over them was to have them converted first: the expulsion decree of 1492 gave Jews the choice of baptism or exile, and the forced conversions in Granada from 1500 and across Castile and Aragon by 1526 did the same for Muslims. Everyone who stayed became, in law, a Christian — and therefore subject to the tribunal.

Moriscos then became a major category of prosecution in the sixteenth century, particularly in Valencia and Aragon, and the eventual answer was not inquisitorial but administrative: expulsion between 1609 and 1614, of perhaps three hundred thousand people.

The other correction worth making is scale. Modern estimates from the tribunal's own records put executions across three and a half centuries at somewhere between three and five thousand — appalling, and an order of magnitude below the figures of the Protestant black legend that shaped the popular picture.

The Moors were Africans.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

"Moor" is not an ethnic category. It comes from the Roman province of Mauretania and was used in medieval and early modern Europe for Muslims generally — North African, Arab, Iberian, and by extension anyone Muslim at all, which is why Shakespeare's Othello is a Moor of Venice and his Prince of Morocco is another.

The population that ruled and inhabited al-Andalus was mixed and changed over time. The conquerors of 711 were mostly Berber — Amazigh, from the Maghreb — under Arab command, with Arabs a small governing minority. Within three centuries the majority of Muslims in the peninsula were descendants of Iberian converts. Successive Berber dynasties, Almoravid and Almohad, brought further North African populations. Sub-Saharan Africans were present, largely as slaves and soldiers; so were saqaliba from central and eastern Europe, in numbers, some of whom ended as kings.

So: some of the people were African, most of the people ruling were of Arab descent, and most of the people living there were Iberian. The word flattens all of it, and both a certain kind of European racial history and a certain kind of Afrocentric reply have used the flattening for opposite purposes.

Muslim scholars preserved Greek philosophy that Europe had lost, and handed it back.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

The transmission is real and the framing is wrong in two ways.

It was not preservation, it was work. The Abbasid translation movement in ninth-century Baghdad rendered Greek philosophy, medicine, mathematics and astronomy into Arabic, and what followed was three centuries of original development: Ibn Sina on medicine and metaphysics, al-Khwarizmi on algebra, Ibn al-Haytham on optics, al-Zahrawi at Córdoba on surgery, Ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle which shaped Latin scholasticism so thoroughly that he is simply "the Commentator" in Aquinas. That is not custodianship of somebody else's inheritance.

And Europe had not lost everything. Byzantium held the Greek texts throughout — Constantinople was a Greek-reading city for the entire period — and some Latin translations came directly from Greek, particularly after 1204 and again in the fifteenth century. The Arabic route through Toledo was the major channel in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and it was not the only one.

The version worth holding is that scholars working in Arabic, in Baghdad and Córdoba and Cairo, advanced a body of knowledge and that Latin Europe acquired it largely through Iberia and Sicily, in a transmission chain that ran through Jewish and Mozarab intermediaries who could read both languages. Ibn Rushd, incidentally, was banished and his books burned in his own lifetime; the Latin West took him more seriously than al-Andalus did.

The thousands of Arabic words in Spanish prove a deep cultural fusion.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

There are around four thousand Arabic-derived words in Spanish, about eight per cent of the lexicon, and the pattern of which words they are is more informative than the number.

They cluster heavily in agriculture and irrigation (acequia, noria, aceite, alcachofa, naranja, arroz, azúcar), building and settlement (alcázar, aldea, albañil, azotea), administration and commerce (alcalde, aduana, almacén, tarifa, arancel), and the sciences (álgebra, cifra, alcohol, azimut). Very many begin with al-, the definite article absorbed into the noun.

What is almost entirely absent is as telling: the core grammar, the pronouns, the numerals, the kinship terms and the basic verbs are all Latin. Spanish is a Romance language with a large Arabic technical and administrative vocabulary — the signature of a population that adopted techniques, institutions and goods rather than one that changed languages.

Which is exactly what happened. Al-Andalus spoke Arabic and also a Romance vernacular; the Mozarabs used both; and when the political frame changed the Romance survived with the borrowings embedded in it.

The caliphate fell to the Christian advance.

False

It destroyed itself in a civil war among Muslims, and the Christian conquest came afterwards and took centuries.

The fitna began in 1009, when the succession to al-Mansur's regency collapsed and the Berber troops, the saqaliba palace guard and the Cordoban aristocracy fought over a series of puppet caliphs. Madinat al-Zahra was sacked in 1010. Córdoba itself was besieged and plundered. The caliphate was formally abolished in 1031 and al-Andalus broke into some three dozen taifa kingdoms.

At that point the Christian kingdoms of the north were small, poor and divided, and their immediate response was not conquest but extortion: they took parias, protection money, from the taifas, in quantities large enough to fund cathedrals. Toledo did not fall until 1085, fifty-four years later, and its fall prompted the Almoravid intervention that reversed much of the Christian advance for another century.

The caliphate, in other words, was not conquered. It disintegrated, and the conquest exploited the disintegration over the following four hundred and sixty-one years.

Al-Andalus was a tolerant society and modern Spain has erased it.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

Spain spent much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with an official history in which the Muslim centuries were an occupation to be expelled — Franco's regime in particular made the Reconquista a founding myth, while simultaneously recruiting Moroccan troops and maintaining a protectorate.

That has changed substantially. Al-Andalus is taught in Spanish schools, the Andalusian regional government funds the sites heavily, Madinat al-Zahra and the Mezquita and the Alhambra are among the country's most visited monuments, and the scholarship coming out of Spanish universities on the subject is world-leading.

What remains contested is ownership. The Mezquita is Church property, registered by the diocese in 2006 under a provision allowing it to register unregistered religious buildings for a nominal fee, which caused a public argument; its official signage for years described it as the cathedral with minimal reference to the mosque, and has been revised under pressure. Muslim groups have periodically requested permission to pray there and been refused by the diocese and the Vatican.

So: a real recovery of the history, alongside an unresolved argument about a building. The second is not erasure, and the people who call it that and the people who dismiss the complaint entirely are both overstating.

Nothing of the caliphate survives.

False

Politically nothing does. Materially and culturally a great deal.

The Mezquita is intact, in the sense that the eight hundred and fifty-six columns and the mihrab are where al-Hakam II left them. Madinat al-Zahra is a tenth excavated and yielding new material continuously. The caliphal baths, the Almanzor-era fortifications, the ivories in Madrid and New York and the Victoria and Albert, the astrolabes, the surgical instruments illustrated in al-Zahrawi's Tasrif — which were still being copied in European manuals four hundred years later — all survive.

The agricultural inheritance is the least visible and the largest: the crops, the irrigation systems, the water courts, and the vocabulary they came with. The Valencia water tribunal still meets on Thursdays.

And the dispersal carried the rest. The Andalusi musical tradition is performed in Fez, Tlemcen and Tunis; Ladino was spoken in Salonika and Istanbul until the twentieth century; families in Tetouan hold keys to houses in Granada. A state that lasted a hundred and two years produced a cultural afterlife of a thousand, and that disproportion is the reason this volume exists.