Mythbusters

Eleven things
people get wrong
about the Commonwealth.

A state remembered by its heirs as a golden age, by its partitioners as a failure that deserved partitioning, and by most English readers not at all. All three positions need correcting.

18 min read

The Commonwealth was a kingdom.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

It had a king, and it was formally the Rzeczpospolita — a direct calque of res publica, the commonwealth or republic — and its own political class called it that and meant it.

The monarch was elected for life by the entire noble estate voting in person, could not name his successor, and was bound by a contract. Every king from 1573 swore the Henrician Articles, which guaranteed religious liberty, free election and regular Sejms, and included the de non praestanda oboedientia clause: if the king broke his undertakings, his subjects were released from obedience to him and entitled to resist. That is a written right of rebellion, sworn by the sovereign, two centuries before it occurred to anybody else.

Contemporaries understood this. Foreign observers described it as a republic with a king at its head, and the nobility described their system as Golden Liberty and regarded absolutist France and Muscovy with open contempt.

The qualification is that the republic was a republic of about eight to ten per cent of the population. The szlachta were unusually numerous by European standards, but the other ninety per cent were townsmen with restricted rights and peasants with very few.

Poland and Lithuania were the same country.

Mostly false

From 1569 they were one state and two countries, and the distinction was maintained deliberately for two hundred and twenty-two years.

The Union of Lublin created a single elected monarch, a single Sejm, one currency and one foreign policy. It explicitly preserved two separate armies, two separate treasuries, two sets of offices and two legal systems — Lithuania kept the Lithuanian Statutes, a codified law of 1529, 1566 and 1588 that was among the most sophisticated in Europe and remained in force in some territories until the 1840s.

The Lithuanian nobility resisted the union for a century and a half, and gave way in 1569 only when Sigismund Augustus, who had no heir, transferred Podlachia, Volhynia and the Kyiv palatinate from Lithuania to Poland by decree while the negotiations were suspended — which removed about a third of the Grand Duchy and made refusal pointless.

Only the Constitution of the Third of May 1791 abolished the dual structure, and the Mutual Guarantee of Two Nations passed in October of that year partially restored it. Fourteen months later the state was in its second partition.

The liberum veto was an absurd rule that destroyed the state.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

The rule that any single deputy could annul a session by objecting is genuinely indefensible as a way of running a large state, and it did paralyse the Commonwealth in the eighteenth century. But the usual account gets the chronology and the mechanism wrong.

It was not an ancient absurdity. It derived from a practice of consensus in a body of deputies bound by instructions from their local dietines, and it was first used to break up a session in 1652 — eighty-three years after the Union. For most of the seventeenth century it was exercised rarely and regarded as a grave step.

Its catastrophic phase is the Saxon period, 1697–1763, when it was used routinely and, crucially, from outside. Russia and Prussia paid deputies to veto: it was cheaper to buy one man than to fight a war, and a foreign power with a modest budget could keep the Commonwealth legislatively dead. Of the Sejms between 1697 and 1763, the large majority were broken up without passing anything.

The nobility knew it was ruinous. The Four-Year Sejm abolished it in 1791. The response of the Commonwealth's neighbours was to invade and restore it, which tells you what it was for by then.

The Commonwealth collapsed because it was chaotic and unreformable.

Mostly false

It was chaotic, and it reformed itself, and it was destroyed for reforming itself. That sequence is the single most important fact about its end and it is routinely omitted.

The Commission of National Education, established in 1773, was the first ministry of education in Europe. The Four-Year Sejm of 1788–92 abolished the liberum veto, ended the elective monarchy, created an inheritable constitutional throne, brought the towns into the political nation and placed the peasantry under legal protection. The Constitution of the Third of May 1791 was the first codified national constitution in Europe.

Catherine II's response was explicit: a Russian army entered in May 1792 at the invitation of the Targowica Confederation, the reforms were annulled, and the Second Partition followed in 1793. Kościuszko's rising in 1794 produced the Third Partition and the end of the state in 1795.

The honest formulation is that the Commonwealth's constitutional weakness made it vulnerable, that its neighbours had by then grown into three of the largest military powers in Europe, and that when it fixed the weakness it was destroyed precisely to prevent the fix taking hold. Prussia, Russia and Austria did not partition a state that could not be reformed; they partitioned one that was reforming.

The winged hussars' wings whistled and terrified enemy horses.

Mostly false

The wings existed and the sound did not. This has been tested, repeatedly, by re-enactors and by museum staff, and feathers mounted on a wooden frame at cavalry speed do not produce a noise audible over a charging horse — let alone over a battle.

The likelier explanations are prosaic and several. Wings and leopard skins made a formation look larger and more alarming at a distance, which is the oldest trick in military display. They may have offered some protection against Tatar lassos, which is mentioned in period sources. And they were ceremonial: a great deal of hussar equipment was parade equipment, and there is real doubt about how often wings were worn in battle at all rather than on entries and funerals.

What actually made the husaria formidable was the lance. Theirs was hollow-cored, up to six metres long — longer than any infantry pike — and used once at the gallop in a closed knee-to-knee charge, after which they fought with sabre, koncerz and pistols. Against infantry that could not form square in time, or cavalry with shorter weapons, it was decisive for well over a century, from Orsza and Kircholm to Vienna.

The wings are on every tourist poster in Poland. The lance is the reason anyone remembers them.

The Commonwealth was uniquely tolerant.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

It was, for about a century, the most religiously tolerant large state in Europe, and the tolerance eroded badly afterwards. Both halves belong in the account.

The Warsaw Confederation of 1573 guaranteed religious liberty to the nobility and was sworn by every subsequent king — at a moment when France was recovering from St Bartholomew's Day and England was executing priests. Protestants, Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Jewish and Muslim Tatar communities all functioned; the Jewish population had its own parliament, the Council of Four Lands, from 1580; the Tatars of Lipka had mosques, some of which survive at Kruszyniany and Bohoniki.

Then it narrowed. The Union of Brest in 1596 split the Orthodox and created lasting grievance. Jesuit education and the Counter-Reformation converted most of the Protestant nobility within two generations. The Polish Brethren — the Socinians, ancestors of Unitarianism — were expelled outright in 1658. Atheism was made a capital offence in 1668. Protestant and Orthodox nobles were excluded from the Sejm in 1733.

The two facts to hold together are that the tolerance was real and legally binding when almost nowhere else had any, and that by the time the Commonwealth fell its dissenters were a pretext its neighbours used against it.

The Commonwealth was a paradise for Jews.

Mostly false

It was, for several centuries, the best place in Europe for Jews to live, which is a statement about Europe.

The invitation was genuine and long-standing: charters of privilege from Bolesław the Pious in 1264 and Casimir the Great in 1334, protection of person and property, and a degree of communal self-government unmatched anywhere. By the eighteenth century something approaching three quarters of the world's Jews lived within these borders. The Council of Four Lands governed internal affairs and negotiated taxation with the crown. Yiddish culture, the Lithuanian yeshiva tradition, the Vilna Gaon and — from the 1740s — Hasidism all developed here because the conditions existed.

Against that: Jews occupied a structurally exposed position as the arendarze, lessees who managed noble estates, mills and taverns and collected dues from Ukrainian Orthodox peasants on behalf of Polish Catholic magnates. That placed them between the two parties in every rural grievance. The Khmelnytsky rising of 1648–57 killed Jews in tens of thousands — the figures are disputed and were catastrophic on any estimate. Blood libel trials occurred; urban guilds excluded Jews; the de non tolerandis Judaeis privilege barred them from some towns entirely.

So: real protection, real autonomy, real prosperity, and a position that was structurally precarious and periodically lethal.

The eastern lands were really Russian all along.

False

This is the partition powers' justification, and it was constructed for the purpose. Catherine II struck a medal after the Second Partition reading what was torn away, I have restored.

The claim rests on Kievan Rus', which disintegrated in the thirteenth century under the Mongols. Its western and southern territories were taken into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the fourteenth, where they were the demographic majority: Ruthenian was the chancery language of the Grand Duchy until 1697, the Lithuanian Statutes were written in it, and the population was Orthodox. Moscow's claim to be the successor of Rus' was a fifteenth- and sixteenth-century construction advanced in competition with Lithuania's, which had rather better possession.

Modern Belarusian and Ukrainian national histories both treat the Grand Duchy as their own inheritance, and on the evidence they have at least as good a case as either Warsaw or Moscow.

The framing also does work in the present, and readers will recognise the argument that these lands were never really separate. It was wrong in 1793 and the documents are available.

Sobieski saved Europe at Vienna.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

He commanded the allied army on the 12th of September 1683, led the decisive charge down the Kahlenberg, and the siege was broken. That much is solid.

The qualifications are three. The relief force was allied, not Polish: Polish and Lithuanian troops numbered around 25,000 of some 70,000, alongside Imperial, Bavarian, Saxon and Franconian contingents, and Charles of Lorraine's generalship is rated by military historians roughly as highly as Sobieski's. The Ottoman army was not on the point of taking Christendom: it had been besieging one city for two months, its logistics were failing, and the Habsburg monarchy would have survived the loss of Vienna. And the idea that this was the moment the Ottoman threat ended flattens a retreat that took another two centuries.

What is less often said is the cost to Poland. The Holy League war that followed ran to 1699 and gained the Commonwealth Podolia back and nothing else; it exhausted a treasury that was already inadequate, and the state entered the eighteenth century — and the Great Northern War, in which it was a battlefield rather than a belligerent — without the resources to defend itself.

Sobieski saved the Habsburgs. Within ninety years the Habsburgs took part in partitioning his country.

The partitions were an inevitable result of Polish weakness.

Mostly false

Weakness was necessary and not sufficient; three decisions by three foreign governments were also required, and they were contingent.

The Commonwealth's military decline was real. It fielded a standing army of about 12,000 in the mid-eighteenth century while Prussia, a fraction of its size, maintained 200,000 — a ratio the Sejm repeatedly declined to change because the nobility distrusted a standing army as an instrument of royal absolutism, and because the tax base to pay for one would have had to come from them.

But the state was not dying of its own accord. Its population was growing, its economy recovering from the Deluge, and its reform movement in the 1770s and 1780s was serious and successful. What killed it was that Russia had established a protectorate over it after 1717 and treated its paralysis as an asset; that Frederick II wanted the territory linking Brandenburg to East Prussia and proposed the first partition in 1772 as an alternative to a Russo-Austrian war; and that all three powers found it cheaper to divide the country than to compete over it.

Partitions were not a normal instrument of European politics — this was the first time a major European state had been eliminated by agreement among its neighbours, and contemporaries across Europe found it shocking. Burke, Rousseau and Jefferson all commented. It happened because three absolutist monarchies wanted it and nobody could stop them.

The Commonwealth has no successor and no relevance.

False

Six states hold its territory and at least four of them argue about it in current politics.

Poland treats it as a golden age and draws on it directly: the Międzymorze or Intermarium — a bloc of states between the Baltic and Black Seas — was Piłsudski's project in the 1920s and reappears in Polish foreign policy discussion today, most recently in the form of the Three Seas Initiative. Lithuania built its modern national identity partly in opposition to Polonisation and fought Poland over Vilnius between 1920 and 1939; the relationship is friendly now and the history is not simple. Belarus's democratic opposition claims the Grand Duchy as its own inheritance, complete with the Pahonia arms, while the government prefers a Soviet frame. Ukraine's relationship runs through Khmelnytsky, a founding figure in Kyiv and a destroyer in Warsaw.

More broadly, the Commonwealth is the largest European experiment in elective monarchy, guaranteed religious liberty, federal union between unequal partners, and a constitutional right of resistance — all of which failed, and all of which were attempted here first and seriously. That is not a footnote. It is the most interesting political laboratory in early modern Europe, and it is barely taught outside the countries that were in it.