Mythbusters

Eleven things
people get wrong
about East Germany.

A country remembered in the West as a grey prison and by a minority of its former citizens as a place with childcare and job security. The evidence does not fully support either.

17 min read

Everyone in East Germany wanted to leave.

Mostly false

Around 3.5 million people left between 1949 and 1961, which is roughly a fifth of the population and is why the Wall was built. After it went up, emigration fell to a trickle and the question changes.

By the 1980s the picture is mixed and better documented than one might expect. Around 600,000 people applied to emigrate legally over the life of the republic, and applying carried real costs — job loss, surveillance, harassment of children at school. That is a large number of people prepared to pay a high price, and it is a small fraction of sixteen million.

The demonstrations of autumn 1989 are the strongest evidence against the simple version. The founding slogan in Leipzig was wir sind das Volk — we are the people — which was a demand for reform, free elections and freedom of movement within a reformed GDR. New Forum's founding appeal did not call for unification. It was only in December, after the Wall was open and West German politicians had engaged, that the chant became wir sind ein Volk, one people.

Then in March 1990 the first free election returned a clear majority for parties campaigning for rapid unification. Both facts are true and the six months between them are the most interesting period in the country's history.

The Trabant was made of cardboard.

False

The body was Duroplast: cotton waste from Soviet textile mills bonded with phenol resin under heat and pressure. It is a genuine composite, closer in principle to early fibreglass than to cardboard, and it does not rust — which in a country where steel was scarce and imported was the point.

The engine is the fair criticism. A 594cc two-stroke of 26 horsepower, essentially unchanged from 1964 to 1990, with no fuel pump — the tank sat above the engine and fed by gravity — no oil pump, so oil had to be mixed into the petrol by hand at the pump, and an exhaust that produced roughly nine times the hydrocarbon emissions of a contemporary Western car.

It also did not burn well in a crash, which is where the cardboard joke came from, and disposing of the bodies after 1990 was a real problem because Duroplast is not recyclable and burns badly. Researchers eventually developed a bacterial process to break it down.

The waiting list was ten to thirteen years. Parents ordered one for a newborn. A used Trabant reliably sold for more than a new one because it existed now, which is the single most efficient illustration of a shortage economy available.

East Germany was uniformly grey.

Mostly false

The photographic record is genuinely grey, and there are reasons for that which are not entirely about socialism: brown coal was the fuel, lignite smoke coated everything, and the historic city centres went unrepaired for forty years because investment went into new housing instead.

But the visual culture was not. GDR graphic design, particularly packaging and posters, was bold and often excellent; the textile and ceramics industries produced distinctive modernist patterns that are now collected; Ostrock bands like the Puhdys and Karat filled stadiums; the children's television of Sandmännchen and the animation studios at Babelsberg were first rate. The Ampelmännchen with his hat — designed in 1961 — survived unification by public campaign and is now on traffic lights across reunified Berlin.

The nostalgia industry that grew up around all this in the 1990s acquired its own name, Ostalgie, and its own critics, who argue reasonably that affection for the packaging can shade into forgetting the prison at Hohenschönhausen.

Both things need holding at once: a state that jailed people for wanting to leave, and a material culture its citizens are entitled to remember fondly without being accused of defending the Stasi.

The Wall was built to keep the West out.

False

The official name was the antifaschistischer Schutzwall, the anti-fascist protective rampart, and its stated purpose was to prevent Western infiltration, sabotage and currency speculation.

The engineering says otherwise. The fortifications faced inward: the death strip, the signal fences, the anti-vehicle obstacles, the raked control strip and the watchtowers' fields of fire were all oriented against people approaching from the East. The order to shoot — the Schiessbefehl, whose existence the GDR denied and whose written form was found in the archives afterwards — applied to people leaving.

The cause is also documented. In the first seven months of 1961 over 150,000 people left, disproportionately young, skilled and professional, through the open border in Berlin; the republic was losing its doctors and engineers at a rate that would have emptied it. Ulbricht pressed Moscow for months for permission to close the border and Khrushchev agreed in August.

Ulbricht's press conference remark on the 15th of June 1961 — that nobody had any intention of building a wall — is the most famous sentence in the country's history, and it is the first recorded public use of the word in that context. The border closed eight weeks later.

The Stasi watched everybody.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

It aspired to, and the numbers are without parallel: around 91,000 full-time employees and some 189,000 unofficial collaborators at the end, against a population of 16.4 million. That is roughly one full-time officer for every 180 citizens — a density several times the Gestapo's and well above the KGB's.

But saturation surveillance is arithmetically impossible even at that ratio, and the ministry's actual method was different and in some ways worse. It concentrated on people it had identified as suspect and then, from the 1970s, applied Zersetzung — decomposition — which meant not arrest but the systematic dismantling of a person's life: rumours spread to employers, marriages broken by forged evidence of affairs, children's university places refused, possessions moved around a flat to induce doubt about one's own sanity. It was designed to be deniable and to leave no marks.

The collaborator figure is the part that has done the most damage since. IMs included people who informed on spouses, friends and congregations, and the opening of the files in 1992 has produced three decades of revelation, divorce, resignation and litigation. Over three million people have applied to read their own file.

The reasonable summary is that the Stasi did not watch everyone and that everyone reasonably believed it might, which is a cheaper and equally effective arrangement.

East Germany was an economic basket case from the start.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

It was the most productive economy in the Eastern bloc and the tenth or so largest industrial producer in the world, with real strengths in optics, chemicals, printing machinery and machine tools. Carl Zeiss Jena was a world leader. Living standards were the highest in the Warsaw Pact.

It was also insolvent by 1989, and the starting conditions were far worse than West Germany's. The Soviet Union took reparations from its zone that the Western allies did not take from theirs — around two thousand factories dismantled and shipped east, half the railway track lifted, uranium mined at Wismut under conditions that killed — while the West received Marshall Aid. Estimates of extraction run to a quarter or a third of industrial capacity.

The system then failed to close the gap. Quantity targets produced hoarding and indifference to quality; Honecker's subsidy programme after 1971 bought consent at the cost of investment; the capital stock aged; and by the 1980s the country was borrowing hard currency from West Germany — including a billion-mark credit arranged in 1983 by Franz Josef Strauss, of all people — to keep going.

The Schürer report of October 1989 told the Politburo that stabilising the debt would require cutting living standards by 25 to 30 per cent. Nine days later the Wall opened.

The Wall's opening on the 9th of November was planned.

False

It was an administrative accident, and the transcript survives.

The Politburo had agreed a new travel regulation intended to relieve pressure by allowing private trips abroad with a permit, to take effect in an orderly way the following day. Günter Schabowski, who had not been at the meeting, was handed the note and read it at an evening press conference on the 9th of November 1989. Asked by the Italian journalist Riccardo Ehrman when it came into force, he shuffled his papers and said — sofort, unverzüglich — immediately, without delay.

West German television carried it within the hour. Crowds gathered at the crossing points. At Bornholmer Strasse the border officer on duty, Harald Jäger, could get no clear order from anybody, watched the crowd grow to thousands, and at about half past eleven opened the barrier on his own authority to avoid a massacre. The other crossings followed.

No shots were fired anywhere that night. The decision that mattered was taken by a lieutenant-colonel who had been on the phone for four hours failing to reach anyone willing to decide, and it is one of the better arguments in modern history for the importance of individual judgement.

Reunification was a straightforward happy ending.

Mostly false

It was popular, it was democratic, and it was economically brutal for the east in ways that are still working through German politics.

The currency union of July 1990 converted Ostmarks to Deutschmarks largely at one to one for savings and wages — politically necessary and economically fatal, since it raised eastern costs overnight to a level at which eastern firms could not sell anything. The Treuhandanstalt, charged with privatising the state's 8,500 enterprises, sold what it could, closed the rest, and by 1994 had presided over a fall in eastern industrial employment of roughly two thirds. Its first president, Detlev Rohwedder, was assassinated in 1991.

Around 1.5 million people moved west in the following decade, disproportionately young and disproportionately women, leaving an ageing and male-skewed population in many small towns. Property restitution to pre-1949 owners produced years of litigation. Eastern academics, judges and officers were largely replaced by westerners.

Thirty-five years on, eastern productivity and wages remain below western levels, the wealth gap is wider than the income gap, and almost no major German company is headquartered in the east. The political consequences are visible in every recent eastern state election.

None of which means the GDR was better. It means unification had costs that were not evenly distributed and were not much discussed at the time.

East Germany was a Soviet puppet with no agency.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

It was created by Soviet occupation, garrisoned by up to half a million Soviet troops, and rescued by Soviet tanks in June 1953. Its leaders could be removed by Moscow and Ulbricht was, in 1971, when Brezhnev decided he had become an obstacle.

But it was not merely an instrument. Ulbricht pressed Moscow for the Wall for months against Khrushchev's reluctance and got it. The GDR ran its own foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East, training police and security services in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Yemen and elsewhere, sometimes ahead of Soviet preferences. Its economic model diverged from the Soviet one — Ulbricht's New Economic System of 1963 was a genuine reform attempt — and Honecker's consumer bargain was his own.

The most striking divergence is at the end. When Gorbachev arrived for the fortieth anniversary in October 1989 and told the leadership that life punishes those who come too late, he was signalling that Moscow would not intervene and that reform was expected. Honecker refused, and the SED leadership spent its last weeks resisting a liberalisation the Soviet Union wanted.

A satellite that has to be pushed towards reform by its patron is not exactly a puppet.

The GDR's Olympic success was pure doping.

Partly true, but more complicated than that

The doping was systematic, state-directed and worse than most people realise. State Plan 14.25, from 1974, authorised the administration of Oral-Turinabol across the sports system — to perhaps ten thousand athletes, including children, frequently without their knowledge and described to them as vitamins. The documented consequences include liver tumours, cardiac damage, infertility, virilisation and children born with disabilities.

And the programme was also genuinely good at everything else. Talent identification through school screening, the Kinder- und Jugendsportschulen system, full-time coaching, sports medicine and biomechanics research — a great deal of which was sound, was published, and was adopted by everybody afterwards. A country of seventeen million finishing second in the medal table at Montreal and Seoul is not explained by steroids alone; other countries had steroids.

The honest position is that the results are uninterpretable. There is no way to separate the effect of the drugs from the effect of the system, and no way to compare against competitors who were also doping in an era with almost no effective testing.

The trials of the 1990s convicted doctors and officials, largely with suspended sentences. The medals have not been reallocated, and a victims' association is still pursuing compensation for people in their fifties and sixties living with the consequences.

Nothing of the GDR is left.

False

A great deal is, and some of it is in daily use across the whole of Germany.

The Ampelmännchen survived a campaign to abolish him and now stands on traffic lights in western cities too. The right of way rule at unmarked junctions, the Grüner Pfeil right-turn-on-red arrow, and several road-traffic conventions came west at unification. So did the polyclinic model, in modified form, and a childcare provision rate the west spent thirty years catching up with.

Institutionally, the Stasi Records Archive is the largest exercise in opening a secret police's files that any country has attempted, and it has been a model for others. The Federal Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship funds the memorials, and the network of museums along the old border is unmatched anywhere.

Politically, the east votes differently, has a distinct party system, and has produced a chancellor who grew up in Templin. The economic divergence has narrowed and not closed.

And the country is unusually well documented, because it collapsed with its archives intact and its citizens then demanded the right to read them. That is why this volume is longer on evidence and shorter on speculation than most in the series.